Xiaojie Chen (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resources that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.

Keywords

socialna dilema;evolucijske igre;javne dobrine;izobilje;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;social dilemma;evolutionary games;public goods;abundance;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Data

Language: English
Year of publishing:
Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization: UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC: 53
COBISS: 20361736 Link will open in a new window
ISSN: 2045-2322
Views: 1236
Downloads: 344
Average score: 0 (0 votes)
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Other data

Secondary language: Slovenian
Secondary keywords: socialna dilema;evolucijske igre;javne dobrine;izobilje;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS): Scientific work
Pages: str. 1-5
Volume: ǂVol. ǂ4
Issue: ǂart. no. ǂ4161
Chronology: 2014
DOI: 10.1038/srep04161
ID: 10844195