Matej Bokalič (Author)

Abstract

V prispevku avtor obravnava program prizanesljivosti kot institut prava varstva konkurence in ekonomski pogled na ta program, zlasti v povezavi s stroškovnim vidikom organa varstva konkurence, ekonomskim vplivom na proračun, kamor se stekajo plačane globe, ter ekonomskim vplivom na v kartele udeležena podjetja. S kritičnim pristopom ovrednoti prednosti in slabosti ekonomske funkcije programa prizanesljivosti z vidika organa varstva konkurence in z vidika udeležencev kartela. Avtor opozarja, da program prizanesljivosti kljub domnevnim pozitivnim učinkom na učinkovitost dela organov varstva konkurence v praksi, teoretično nima možnosti za svoje temeljito poslanstvo, če učinkovitost organa varstva konkurence že per se ne bo predstavljala resne grožnje za odkritje kartelov in sankcioniranje udeležencev.

Keywords

Evropska unija;gospodarsko pravo;konkurenca;konkurenčno pravo;varstvo konkurence;

Data

Language: Slovenian
Year of publishing:
Typology: 1.04 - Professional Article
Organization: UM PF - Faculty of Law
UDC: 339.137.2:347.7(4)
COBISS: 262847744 Link will open in a new window
ISSN: 1855-7147
Parent publication: Lexonomica
Views: 588
Downloads: 43
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Other data

Secondary language: English
Secondary title: Economic aspects of leniency program in European Union
Secondary abstract: Author deals with leniency program as a special concept of competition law and its economic aspects, especially in the connection with costs, economic influence on state budget and on cartel participants. He uses critical approach to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of economic function of leniency program from the view of competition authorities and cartel participants. Author asserts that leniency program, despite its supposed positive effects on the effectiveness of competition authorities' work in practice, theoretically has no chance for success if the effectiveness of competition authorities per se will not present a serious threat to disclose cartels and to sanction the cartel participants.
Secondary keywords: competition law;leniency program;immunity of fine;reduction of fine;cartel;competition authority;
URN: URN:NBN:SI
Type (COBISS): Professional work
Pages: str. 67-87
Volume: ǂLetn. ǂ3
Issue: ǂšt. ǂ1
Chronology: jun. 2011
ID: 10949806
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