Kazenskopravna krivda kot družbi potrebna fikcija

(magistrsko diplomsko delo)

Žiga Pavletič (Author), Matjaž Ambrož (Mentor)

Abstract

Avtor v magistrski diplomski nalogi raziskuje koncept kazenskopravne krivde in njegove potrebnosti za urejanje družbenih odnosov. Uvodoma kratko predstavi teoretično kazenskopravno ureditev krivde v materialnem in procesnem smislu. Koncept krivde predpostavlja obstoj svobodne volje, ki krivdo pravzaprav utemeljuje in legitimira kaznovanje kot njeno posledico. Resničnost obstoja svobodne volje je od nekdaj predmet filozofskih razprav, ki jih avtor predstavi skozi argumente deterministov, libertarcev in kompatibilistov. Kljub različnim filozofskim pogledom, ki so postavili pod vprašaj koncept svobodne volje in ga dodobra zrelativizirali, se avtor s tovrstnimi zaključki ne zadovolji, temveč poišče odgovore v zvezi s tem tudi na področju (naravoslovnih) znanosti. Te namreč delujejo po znanstveni metodi, ki prek konstantnega dvoma in preizkušanja postavljenih hipotez razkriva resnično naravo sveta okrog nas in v nas. Predvsem nevroznanost s svojimi spoznanji že dalj časa ruši intuitivno človeško prepričanje o obstoju svobodne volje in posledično koncepta krivde. Avtor predstavi nekatere najodmevnejše raziskave v povezavi s svobodno voljo, ki precej prepričljivo dokazujejo, da naši možgani delujejo skladno z determinističnimi zakoni narave, ter da je človeške odločitve in ravnanja mogoče vse natančneje pojasnjevati z mehanističnimi procesi, ki potekajo v nevronskih strukturah možganov. Omenjeno naj bi kazalo, kljub nekaterim nasprotnim argumentom kritikov, da je občutek svobodne volje zgolj privid, (kazenskopravna) krivda pa fikcija. V nadaljevanju se avtor posveča argumentom, ki zagovarjajo potrebnost koncepta krivde za pravni sistem in urejanje medosebnih odnosov. Med njimi zlasti dejstvo, da je koncept krivde skladen z intuicijami ljudi o človeški naravi, zato se ji pravni sistem, če želi biti legitimen in učinkovit, ne more odpovedati, dokler se splošno prepričanje ljudi ne spremeni. Obravnava tudi argument nepovezljivosti znanstvenih spoznanj z normativnim urejanjem, po katerem naj področji ne bi proučevali in urejali medsebojno kompatibilnih fenomenov. Zadnji argument, ki ga avtor predstavi, je potreba po kaznovanju kot neločljiv del človeške narave. Krivda kot predpostavka kaznovanja bo obstala, saj je kaznovanje evolucijsko programirana značilnost ljudi, namenjena ohranitvi nemotenega delovanja družbene skupnosti, hkrati pa tudi zadovoljevanju naših primitivnih vzgibov. Na koncu avtor predstavi nekatere rešitve za kaznovalno prakso, ki jih prinašajo odkritja o naravi človeka in neobstoju svobodne volje (krivde), predvsem usmeritev kaznovanja v utilitarne cilje in alternativne načine izvajanja ter opustitev retribucije. Avtor sklene, da je kazenskopravna krivda družbi še vedno potrebna – za delovanje pravnega sistema in urejanje družbenih odnosov – bi pa sčasoma, ob spremembi ljudskih pogledov nanjo (in sprejetju znanstvenih argumentov determinizma), lahko postala odvečen element pravnih sistemov.

Keywords

kazensko pravo;krivda;kazenska odgovornost;kaznovanje;kaznovalna politika;svobodna volja;determinizem;mehanicizem;redukcionizem;nevroznanosti;možgani;znanstvena metodologija;družba;družbeni odnosi;magistrske diplomske naloge;

Data

Language:	Slovenian
Year of publishing:	2019
Typology:	2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:	UL PF - Faculty of Law
Publisher:	[Ž. Pavletič]
UDC:	343.222:159.947.2(043.2)
COBISS:	16651601
Views:	1234
Downloads:	750
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	English
Secondary title:	Criminal guilt as fiction needed by the society
Secondary abstract:	The author in his master’s thesis examines the concept of criminal guilt and its need for regulating social relationships. In the beginning he briefly presents the theory of guilt in criminal law system, both from material and procedural perspective. The presumption of the concept of guilt is the existence of free will, which justifies the guilt and as a consequence legitimises punishment. The existence of free will has always been subject to philosophical debates, which are represented by the author through the arguments of determinists, libertarians and compatibilists. Despite different philosophical views that questioned the existence of free will and highly relativized this concept, the author is not satisfied with these conclusions and is searching for the explanations in the field of natural science as well. The latter are operating in accordance with the scientific method, which through constant doubt, questioning and testing of the proposed hypothesis, reveals the true nature of the world around us and within us. Mainly neuroscience and its findings have long been destroying our intuitive belief in the existence of free will and the concept of guilt. The author presents some of the most important research of the free will, which quite conclusively demonstrates that our brains operate in accordance with the deterministic laws of nature. In addition, human decisions and actions could be more and more precisely explained by mechanistic processes taking place in neural brain structures. Despite some opposing arguments of the critics, these findings suggest that the feeling of free will is merely an illusion and (criminal) guilt is in consequence only a fiction. Further on, the author gives attention to the arguments that argue the need for the concept of guilt in our legal system and for the regulation of interpersonal relationships. Among them, in particular the fact that the concept of guilt is consistent with our intuitions about human nature, and therefore the legal system cannot give up on the concept if it wants to be legitimate and effective, at least not until the general belief in public changes in this respect. The author also deals with the argument of incompatibility between scientific knowledge and normative regulation, since the phenomena these fields are studying and regulating are mutually incompatible. The last argument presented by the author is the need to punish as an inseparable part of human nature. Guilt as the presumption of punishment will endure, since punishment is an evolutionary programmed humans’ trait, intended to preserve the undisturbed functioning of human society, while at the same time also to satisfy our primitive motives to punish. In the end the author presents some solutions for the practice of punishment, uncovered by the discoveries regarding human nature and non-existence of free will (guilt), in particular the direction to utilitarian goals and alternative means in implementation of punishment and the omission of retribution. The author concludes that criminal guilt is still necessary for the society – for the functioning of its legal system and regulation of social relations – but could eventually, upon the change in people’s views on the concept of guilt (and the adoption of scientific arguments of determinism), become a redundant element of legal systems.
Secondary keywords:	criminal law;guilt;criminal liability;punishment;free will;determinism;mechanicism;reductionism;neurosciences;brain;scientific method;society;social relations;
Type (COBISS):	Master's thesis/paper
Study programme:	0
Embargo end date (OpenAIRE):	1970-01-01
Thesis comment:	Univ. v Ljubljani, Pravna fak.
Pages:	87 f.
ID:	11061081