Reconsidering Wendt's meta-theory

blending scientific realism with social constructivism

Abstract

The main argument of the article is that claims of scientific realism and social constructivism cannot be compatible in the ways Wendt tries to defend them in his Social Theory of International Politics. Neither scientific realism nor social constructivism makes much sense in conjunction with positivist methodology, which is ontologically predominantly anti-realist and epistemologically objectivist. The combination Wendt proposes is thus either a particular positivist variation of scientific realism or a particular positivist variation of social constructivism, and strips scientific realism and social constructivism of their more radical consequences for understanding and explaining international relations. The claims that the discipline of International Relations (IR) practically need not fear Wendt, and that IR theorists are better off engaging (not ignoring) him may be substantiated if his scientific realism is detached from methodological positivism. His metatheory, in addition to more sophisticated variants of scientific realism (e.g. critical realism), offers more possibilities than his reductionist strategy of theorising allows to be seen into the really comp lex ontology of international relations. Thus, the fact that he dares to speak about the reality "out there" should not be discarded too easily, and some proposals are developed throughout the text on how to accommodate such a claim always conjectural - with scientific realism and social constructivism.

Keywords

international relations;theory of international relations;scientific realism;social constructivism;methodological positivism;statism;Alexander Wendt;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2001
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UL FDV - Faculty of Social Sciences
UDC:	327:165
COBISS:	117048832
ISSN:	1408-6980
Views:	103
Downloads:	7
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary title:	Vnovičen premislek Wendtove metateorije
Secondary abstract:	Glavna ugotovitev članka je, da trditve znanstvenega realizma in družbenega konstruktivizma ne morejo biti združljive tako, kot to skuša braniti Wendt v svoji knjigi Social Theory of International Politics. Niti znanstveni realizem niti družbeni konstruktivizem namreč nista smiselna v povezavi s pozitivistično metodologijo, ki je ontološko predvsem nerealistična in epistemološko objektivistična. Kombinacija, ki jo predlaga Wendt, je tako ali določena pozitivistična različica znanstvenega realizma ali pa določena pozitivistična različica družbenega konstruktivizma. Kot taka znanstvenemu realizmu in družbenemu konstruktivizmu onemogoča razvitje do točke, ki bi imela bolj radikalne posledice za razumevanje in pojasnjevanje mednarodnih odnosov. Trditvi, da se znanstveni disciplini o mednarodnih odnosih praktično ni treba bati Wendta in da bi bilo za njene teoretike bolje, ko bi se soočili z njim (ne pa, da ga ignorirajo), je mogoče podkrepiti, če Wendtov znanstveni realizem ločimo od metodološkega pozitivizrna, Njegova metateorija, skupaj z bolj sofisticiranimi različicami znastvenega realizma (npr. kritičnega realizma), ponuja več možnosti, kot jih njegova redukcionistična strategija teoretiziranja dovoljuje spoznati v resnično kompleksni ontologiji mednarodnih odnosov. Zato dejstva, da si Wendt upa govoriti o "realnosti tam zunaj", ne kaže prehitro zavreči. Avtor članka zato razvija nekatere predloge, da bi znanstvenemu realizmu in družbenemu konstruktivizmu prilagodil zgornjo - sicer vedno domnevno - trditev.
Secondary keywords:	mednarodni odnosi;teorija mednarodnih odnosov;znanstveni realizem;družbeni konstruktivizem;metodološki pozitivizem;državocentričnost;Alexander Wendt;
Type (COBISS):	Article
Pages:	str. 339-362, 437, 440
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ4
Issue:	ǂno. ǂ4
Chronology:	Dec. 2001
ID:	14890027