Sovražni govor na spletnih družbenih omrežjih

magistrsko delo

Jasmina Mitev (Author), Miha Šepec (Mentor)

Abstract

Univerzalna definicija sovražnega govora ne obstaja, zato se ta v okviru posameznih držav in organizacij, predvsem pa na eni strani na evropskih tleh, na drugi strani pa na ameriških tleh, razlikuje. Enako velja za sovražni govor na spletnih družbenih omrežjih, četudi so zanj dodatno značilne še nekatere ključne lastnosti, kot so stalnost, potujočnost, anonimnost, medjurisdikcijska narava spletnih vsebin, širok nabor spletnih družbenih omrežij, etc. Problematika se pojavi že pri samoregulacijskih politikah posameznih spletnih družbenih omrežjih, pri čemer je razvidno, da e.g. Facebook, Instagram in Twitter, kot ena izmed največjih tovrstnih omrežij, sovražni govor pojmujejo drugače. S tem imamo v mislih razlike že v samem poimenovanju tega pojma, nadalje razlike glede tega, koga oziroma katere skupine posamezna spletna družbena omrežja vštevajo med zaščitene kategorije na podlagi določenih osebnih okoliščin, nenazadnje pa v podrobnejši izpeljavi teh splošnih definicij. Ta spletna družbena omrežja torej sovražni govor najprej prepoznavajo, nato pa se nanj morebiti odzivajo in ga sankcionirajo predvsem preko svojih lastnih smernic oziroma pravil. Do te situacije pride, ker platforme družbenih medijev običajno niso vezane na teritorialnost oziroma jurisdikcijo določenega ozemlja, na katerem se zgolj uporabljajo, nimajo pa tam svojega sedeža podjetja. V kolikor pa ima določeno podjetje družbenih medijev sedež v določeni nacionalni jurisdikciji, bodo predpisi te jurisdikcije nanj neposredno vplivali, kar bo posledično (običajno) pomenilo tudi večjo odzivnost na (dodatne) zahteve te jurisdikcije po omejitvi sovražnega govora na spletnih družbenih omrežjih. A izpostaviti velja, da večino teh spletnih družbenih omrežij upravljajo ameriška (zasebna) podjetja, s sedežem v posameznih državah Združenih držav Amerike, zato se zanje (običajno) uporabi zgolj tista jurisdikcija, ki je značilna za ameriški prostor. Za slednjega je sicer res značilna poudarjena svoboda govora kot splošno pravilo že na ustavni ravni, a se ta v skladu z odločitvami sodišč ne razširi na zasebna podjetja. To poenostavljeno pomeni, da so ta podjetja upravičena do uporabe svojevrstnih (lastnih) smernic, glede katerih je njihova odgovornost izključena. Ravno nasprotno pa za evropske standarde ni dovolj, da bi bil sovražni govor na spletnih družbenih omrežjih prepuščen njihovi samostojni ureditvi, zato je zanje značilna strožja ureditev bodisi na ravni posameznih držav bodisi na mednarodni ravni. Predvsem pri prvi je potrebno biti izjemno previden, da ne bi s takšno ureditvijo organi posameznih držav pretirano posegali v eno izmed temeljnih svoboščin posameznika, tj. v svobodo izražanja. Zato je toliko pomembnejša ureditev tematike na mednarodni ravni, predvsem z ureditvijo Evropske unije, ki do tovrstne tematike pristopa previdneje, a hkrati daje minimalna skupna načela prepoznavanja, odziva in posledic sovražnega govora na spletnih družbenih omrežjih njenim državam članicam.

Keywords

sovražni govor;spletna družbena omrežja;Facebook;Instagram;Twitter;evropski standardi;ameriški standardi;svoboda izražanja;

Data

Language:	Slovenian
Year of publishing:	2022
Typology:	2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:	UM PF - Faculty of Law
Publisher:	[J. Mitev]
UDC:	343.32(043.3)
COBISS:	142770179
Views:	30
Downloads:	4
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	English
Secondary title:	Hate speech on online social networks
Secondary abstract:	There is no universal definition of hate speech, which is why it differs in the context of individual countries and organizations, especially on the one hand in Europe, and on the other hand in America. The same applies to hate speech on online social networks, even if it is additionally characterized by some key features, such as permanence, mobility, anonymity, interjurisdictional nature of online content, a wide range of online social networks, etc. The problem already arises with the self-regulatory policies of individual online social networks, whereby it is evident that for example Facebook, Instagram and Twitter, as one of the largest networks of its kind, understand hate speech differently. By this we have in mind differences in the very naming of this concept, further differences in who or which groups of individual online social networks count as protected categories based on certain personal circumstances, and last but not the least in the more detailed derivation of these general definitions. These online social networks therefore first recognize hate speech, and then possibly react to it and sanction it primarily through their own guidelines or rules. This situation occurs because social media platforms are usually not tied to the territoriality or jurisdiction of the specific territory in which they are merely used, but they do not have their company headquarters there. However, to the extent that a particular social media company is based in a particular national jurisdiction, it will be directly affected by the regulations of that jurisdiction, which in turn (usually) will also mean greater responsiveness to the (additional) requirements of that jurisdiction to restrict hate speech on online social networks. But it is worth pointing out that most of these online social networks are managed by American (private) companies, with headquarters in individual states of the United States of America, so they are (usually) only subject to the jurisdiction that is typical for the American space. The latter is indeed characterized by emphasized freedom of speech as a general rule already at the constitutional level, but in accordance with the decisions of the courts, this does not extend to private companies. This simply means that these companies are entitled to use their specific guidelines for which their liability is excluded. On the contrary, it is not enough for European standards to leave hate speech on online social networks to their own regulation, which is why they are characterized by stricter regulation either at the level of individual countries or at the international level. Especially with the first one, it is necessary to be extremely careful, so that the authorities of individual countries do not excessively interfere with one of the fundamental freedoms of the individual, i.e. the freedom of expression. That is why the regulation of the topic at the international level is all the more important, especially with the regulation of the European Union, which approaches this type of topic more cautiously, but at the same time gives its member states minimum common principles of recognition, response and consequences of hate speech on online social networks.
Secondary keywords:	hate speech;online social networks;Facebook;Instagram;Twitter;European standards;American standards;freedom of expression;Univerzitetna in visokošolska dela;
Type (COBISS):	Master's thesis/paper
Thesis comment:	Univ. v Mariboru, Pravna fak.
Source comment:	Sistemske zahteve: Acrobat reader
System comment:	Sistemske zahteve: Acrobat reader
Pages:	1 spletni vir (1 datoteka PDF (83 str.))
ID:	16949220