Pravo in čustva

(magistrsko - diplomsko delo)

Eva Dolinšek (Author), Aleš Novak (Mentor)

Abstract

Objektivnost je ena od temeljnih načel vsakega pravnega sistema in to še toliko bolj pride do izraza v vsakem konkretnem primeru pred sodiščem. V svojem magistrskem delu pa se osredotočim na nasprotje te zahteve in se sprašujem, ali so čustva v sodni dvorani popolnoma prepovedana in ali vedno vodijo v pristransko sprejeto sodnikovo odločitev. S pomočjo teoretične podlage ugotavljam, da čustva niso vedno nekaj slabega. Biti sodnik namreč pomeni biti čustven, zato se v nalogi sprašujem, koliko se tega sodniki zavedajo in kako to vpliva na sprejemanje odločitev. Osvetlim vprašanje, ali je vpliv čustev nujno škodljiv in ko ugotovim, da odgovor ni pritrdilen, obravnavam merila in pogoje tistih čustev, ki so med sojenjem zaželena. To storim v želji prikazati razmejitev med primeri škodljive in neškodljive čustvenosti. Izvor take razmejitve najdem v vrednotah, s katerimi je prav tako potrebno biti previden, saj so razumljene relativno in jih je mogoče različno interpretirati. Gre namreč za kolizijo vrednot, ki podpirajo sodnikovo posamično odločitev in vrednot, na katerih bazira pravni sistem.

Keywords

sojenje;čustva;pristranskost;sodniki;vrednote;odločanje;kvaliteta sojenja;razum;

Data

Language:	Slovenian
Year of publishing:	2023
Typology:	2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:	UL PF - Faculty of Law
Publisher:	[E. Dolinšek]
UDC:	340.1(043.2)
COBISS:	158422531
Views:	68
Downloads:	26
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	English
Secondary title:	Law and emotions
Secondary abstract:	Objectivity is one of the basic principles of any legal system, and this is all the more apparent when it comes to each specific case before the court. However, my master’s thesis considers the opposing view, and explores whether emotions should be completely forbidden in the courtroom, and whether they always lead to biased decisions by the judge. Using a theoretical basis, I have found that emotions are not always a bad thing. Being a judge means being emotional, so in my thesis I ask to what extent judges are aware of this and how it affects their decision-making. After examining the question of whether the influence of emotions is necessarily harmful, my answer is not always affirmative, and therefore I address the criteria and conditions of those emotions that are desirable during a trial. I do this in an attempt to show the demarcation between cases of harmful and harmless emotionality. The origin of such a demarcation can be located in values, which also need to be treated with caution, since they are understood in relative terms and are open to interpretation. This is a case of a conflict between the values that support the judge's individual decision, and the values on which the legal system is based.
Secondary keywords:	trial;emotions;bias;judges;values;decision-making;quality of trial;reason;Univerzitetna in visokošolska dela;
Type (COBISS):	Master's thesis/paper
Study programme:	0
Embargo end date (OpenAIRE):	1970-01-01
Thesis comment:	Univ. v Ljubljani, Pravna fak.
Pages:	51 f.
ID:	19283183