Utelešena filozofska psihologija

Merleau-Ponty in Wittgenstein

Jaka Bombač (Author), Sebastjan Vörös (Mentor)

Abstract

Filozofija je tradicionalno veljala za tisto vejo vednosti, iz katere so izpeljane vse znanosti, pa tudi za tisto temeljno vedo, ki nam pomaga pri osmišljanju našega položaja v svetu ter snovanju odnosa do drugih ljudi in živih bitij. V sodobnosti se zaradi prevlade psihološkega mišljenja ta ključna vloga filozofije izgublja. V tej nalogi bom poskušal pokazati, da je filozofija še vedno relevantna, ne le v svoji sokratski (dialektični) razsežnosti, ampak tudi kot podlaga, na kateri gradimo in utemeljujemo različne znanosti ter njihove medsebojne povezave. Filozofija nam lahko v sodobnosti, prežeti z različnimi psihološkimi doktrinami, pomaga pri oblikovanju kritičnega odnosa do njih, saj je zaradi poudarka na pojmovni analizi zmožna kritično premeriti implicitne predpostavke različnih razlagalnih sistemov. V tej nalogi bom poskušal pokazati, kako lahko s pojmovno analizo, ki sta jo vsaksebi razvijala Merleau-Ponty in Wittgenstein, osmislimo temeljne psihološke doktrine 20. stoletja: introspekcionizem, behaviorizem, kognitivizem in gestalt psihologijo. Pri tem bom poskušal osvetliti temeljne podobnosti in razlike med Merleau-Pontyjevim in Wittgensteinovim pristopom. Čeprav sta si filozofa v številnih pogledih izjemno različna, bom dokazoval, da so njuni filozofski razmisleki v kontekstu sodobne filozofske psihologije ne le združljivi, temveč se medsebojno dopolnjujejo. Oba namreč analizirata pojme občutka, zaznave, pozornosti in telesnosti, s čimer po mojem mnenju posodobita tradicionalno filozofsko psihologijo, izvirajočo iz 18. stoletja, katere glavni predmet je bila določitev dometa znanstvene psihologije. Zaključil bom, da je filozofska psihologija ključna za ohranjanje možnosti nove psihologije, ki stremi k ohranjanju vloge izkustva. Pri tem bom poudaril, da izkustva ne želim razumeti kot nečesa presežnega, ampak ravno nasprotno, kot nekaj primarnega, kot negativno točko, okrog katere se razporejajo vse (pozitivne) vsebine.

Keywords

filozofija;psihologija;kognitivizem;behaviorizem;znanost;utelešenost;magistrska dela;

Data

Language:	Slovenian
Year of publishing:	2024
Typology:	2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:	UL FF - Faculty of Arts
Publisher:	[J. Bombač]
UDC:	159.9:1(043.2)
COBISS:	209460995
Views:	22
Downloads:	933
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	English
Secondary title:	Embodied philosophical psychology: Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein
Secondary abstract:	Philosophy has traditionally been considered the branch of knowledge from which all sciences are derived, as well as the fundamental science that helps us make sense of our position in the world and develop our relationship with other people and living beings. In modern times, due to the dominance of psychological opinion, this key role of philosophy is getting lost in translation. In this assignment, I will try to show that philosophy is still relevant, not only in its Socratic (dialectical) dimension, but also as a basis on which we build and justify different sciences and their interconnections. Philosophy can help us in modern times, imbued with various psychological doctrines, to form a critical attitude towards them, because the philosophical emphasis on conceptual analysis makes it possible to critically address the implicit assumptions of various explanatory systems. In this assignment, I will try to show how we can make sense of the fundamental psychological doctrines of the 20th century – introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitivism and gestalt psychology – with the conceptual analysis developed separately by Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty. In doing so, I will try to distinguish the fundamental similarities and differences between Merleau-Ponty's and Wittgenstein's approaches. Although the two philosophers are extremely different in many respects, I will show that their philosophical considerations are compatible in the context of modern philosophical psychology. Namely, both of them analyze the notions of feeling, perception, attention and the body, which, in my opinion, modernize the traditional philosophical psychology originating in the 18th century, whose main object was to determine the scope of scientific psychology. I will conclude that philosophical psychology is key to maintaining the possibility of a new psychology that seeks to preserve the role of experience. Here I will emphasize that I do not want to understand the experience as something superfluous, but on the contrary, as something primary, as a negative point around which all (positive) content is arranged.
Secondary keywords:	philosophy;psychology;cognitivism;behaviorism;science;embodiment;Wittgenstein;Ludwig;1889-1951;Merleau-Ponty;Maurice;1908-1961;
Type (COBISS):	Master's thesis/paper
Study programme:	1011046
Embargo end date (OpenAIRE):	1970-01-01
Thesis comment:	Univ. v Ljubljani, Filozofska fak., Oddelek za filozofijo
Pages:	79 str.
ID:	25202181