Sokratska prevara za resnico kot Kierkegaardov prehod med iracionalnostjo in racionalnostjo

Abstract

Kierkegaardov pogled na človekove razumske zmožnosti v odnosu do vere predstavlja v interpretaciji njegovih del pomemben problem. Članek se osredotoča na vprašanje racionalnosti. Želi nasloviti dejstvo, da se Kierkegaardova misel na nekaterih mestih izraža iracionalno, medtem ko se na drugih kaže v bolj racionalni luči. Članek dilemo poskuša videti v luči posebne metode, sokratske prevare, ki jo je Kierkegaard oblikoval po Sokratovem zgledu. Najprej prikažemo mesta, kjer se Kierkegaardova misel izraža kot iracionalna – v smeri bodisi fideizma bodisi relativizma. Članek nadalje ob zavedanju teh iracionalnih potez opiše, kako danski pisec z zgledovanjem po Sokratu predstavi posebno metodo prevare za resnico. Gre za hermenevtični ključ, ki nam omogoča Kierkegaardove prvotne očitke racionalnosti brati v luči širšega smisla. V zadnjem delu se osredotočamo še na konkretne posledice, ki iz tega sokratskega prehoda izhajajo. Tako lahko še bolje osvetlimo, kakšne so značilnosti Kierkegaardove paradoksalne racionalnosti.

Keywords

psevdonim;prevara za resnico;racionalnost;razumeti;naravni razum;

Data

Language:	Slovenian
Year of publishing:	2021
Typology:	1.02 - Review Article
Organization:	UL TEOF - Theological Faculty
UDC:	165.61/.63Kierkegaard S.
COBISS:	72600835
ISSN:	0006-5722
Views:	5
Downloads:	1
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	English
Secondary title:	Socratic deception in service of the truth as Kierkegaard's pathway between irrationality and rationality
Secondary abstract:	Kierkegaard’s view on rational human abilities in relation to faith presents an important problem when researching his works. The article focuses on the question of rationality. It aims to explain the fact that in specific segments, Kierkegaard’s thought seems irrational, while in others, it appears more rational. The article tries to see this dilemma in light of a particular method, the Socratic deception devised by Kierkegaard himself, whom Socrates inspired. First of all, segments in which Kierkegaard’s thought appears irrational, either in the way of fideism or relativism, are shown. Being aware of these irrational characteristics, the article then describes how the Danish author presents a Socrates-inspired method of deception in service of the truth. This presents a hermeneutic key that offers his initial irrationalities to be read in a broader sense. The last part of the article aims to show specific consequences that emerge from this Socratic pathway. Thus, more characteristics are presented regarding Kierkegaard’s paradoxical rationality.
Secondary keywords:	pseudonym;deception in service of the truth;rationality;to understand;natural reason;Kierkegaard;Soren;1813-1855;Sokrates;470-399 pr.n.št.;
Type (COBISS):	Article
Pages:	str. 35-46
Volume:	ǂLetn. ǂ81
Issue:	ǂ[št.] ǂ1
Chronology:	2021
DOI:	10.34291/BV2021/01/Gregorcic
ID:	25290980