Napake bonitetnih agencij

magistrsko delo

Nika Leljak (Author), Sebastjan Strašek (Mentor)

Abstract

Raziskovalno delo se ukvarja s problemom neobjektivnosti ter vse večjega števila napak, ki jih delajo bonitetne agencije. Še posebej pozorni bomo na tri največje agencije na svetu, to so: S&P, Moody’s ter Fitch, ki skupaj zavzemajo več kot 95% celotnega bonitetnega trga. Podrobneje si bomo ogledali pretekle finančne/gospodarske krize in napačno vrednotenje ameriških propadlih koncernov. Napačne bonitetne ocene, ki so prenizke ali previsoke, imajo velik vpliv na določene, za državo zelo pomembne, parametre. Višjo bonitetno oceno kot dobi država, po nižjih stroški se bo lahko zadolževala in obratno. Do neobjektivnosti pri vrednotenju pride iz večih razlogov. Najpogostejši razlog je profitni motiv agencij, ki privede do konflikta interesov. Agencije v veliki večini poslujejo po poslovnem modelu “izdajatelj plača”, kar pomeni, da je naročnik in plačnik ocene, izdajatelj vrednostnega papirja. Ker agencije plača nekdo, kogar morajo objektivno oceniti, prihaja do konflikta interesov, saj so v osnovi agencije profitne institucije, ki poslujejo z enormno visokimi dobički. Problem se nahaja tudi v skoncentriranosti agencij na območju Združenih držav Amerike in zelo omejenem številu agencij, kar priča o oligopliji ter pomanjkanju konkurence. V zgodovini se je pojavilo veliko primerov, v katerih so bonitetne agencije storile hude napake in te napake so nosile posledice. Ugotovimo pa lahko tudi, da agencije niso znale niti pravočasno predvideti prihajajočih finančnih kriz in pred njimi posvariti.

Keywords

bonitetna ocena;bonitetne agencije;vrednotenje;objektivnost;napake;

Data

Language:	Slovenian
Year of publishing:	2015
Typology:	2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:	UM EPF - Faculty of Economics and Business
Publisher:	[N. Leljak]
UDC:	336.763.33
COBISS:	12063516
Views:	812
Downloads:	156
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	English
Secondary title:	Credit rating agenciesʼ failures
Secondary abstract:	This research work deals with the problem of the lack of objectivity and a growing number of errors made by the credit rating agencies. Particular attention will be given to the three largest agencies in the world, namely: S&P, Moody's and Fitch, which together occupy more than 95% of the total credit market share. We will analyse this against several practical examples of past financial crises as well as defaulting of major US corporations such as Enron, Lehman Brothers, AIG and others. Misratings, whether too low or too high, have a significant impact on certain important parameters of a given country. The higher the rating a country gets, the lower its cost of borrowing will be, and vice versa. The lack of objectivity in the evaluation process occurs for several reasons. Most commonly, the reason is the profit motive of the agencies, which leads to a conflict of interest. Agencies in the vast majority operate on a business model following the "issuer pays" principle, which means that the client and payer of the ratings is the issuer of the security. Since the agencies get paid by someone whom they should objectively evaluate, this creates a conflict of interests, given the fact that they are essentially profitable institutions with enormously high earnings. Additional problem lies in the high concentration of agencies in the territory of the United States as well as in the limited number of operating agencies on a whole, reflecting the oligopoly of the markert and a severe lack of competition. There are a lot of historical examples in which credit rating agencies committed serious errors which carried consequences. We can also conclude, that the agencies have failed to accuretely anticipate and warn of the upcoming financial crises.
Secondary keywords:	credit rating;credit rating agencies;rating failures;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Master's thesis/paper
Thesis comment:	Univ. v Mariboru, Ekonomsko-poslovna fak.
Pages:	IV, 75 str.
ID:	8752839