Model pravne subjektivitete živali

diplomsko delo

Klementina Semprimožnik (Author), Tomaž Keresteš (Mentor)

Abstract

Pravo je izraz konsenza v določeni kulturno-civilizacijski skupnosti, zato je vsak njegov konstrukt potrebno presojati v okviru širšega družbenopolitičnega konteksta. Kakor je eskalacija pojma človekovih pravic povezana s specifično družbeno klimo v tistih pravnih svetovih, v katerih je svoj prostor našel tudi diskurz o naravni, neodtujljivi vrednosti človeka, je tudi možnost ustanovitve inštituta pravic nečloveških živali potrebno postaviti na teoretsko osnovo pravnega statusa osebe posamezne nečloveške živali. Seveda je potrebno ustaljene mentalne vzorce v prvi vrsti premotriti v okviru drugih strokovnih krogov (v etiki, filozofiji, sociologiji, antropologiji), kjer danes že potekajo resne razprave o predrugačenju medvrstnih odnosov, vendarle pa bi lahko tudi pravna misel prispevala svoj pogled na obravnavani proces liberalizacije vseh živali. Trenutni pravni položaj nečloveških živali je zaradi zgodovinskega antropocentričnega moralnega predsodka izrazito nepravičen. Zahodna moralna paradigma podeljuje pravno upošteven moralni status le ljudem, in sicer vsem priznava enako temeljno moralno varstvo, ostale živali pa degradira na rudimentarni nivo instrumentalne vrednosti za dosego smotrov ljudi, kar se kaže v njihovem moralnem statusu ničelne stopnje. Vzpostavljeni mehanizmi varovanja njihove integritete so zreducirani na minimum in so namenjeni predvsem preprečevanju nepotrebne krutosti človeka do njih. Čeprav znanost že od razvoja evolucionistične biologije ne uspe dokazati razlikovanja med organskim ustrojem človeških in nečloveških živali, ki bi vzrokoval različno občutenje (tako človeške kot večina nečloveških živali na svojstven način kažejo interese po izogibanju bolečini ter občutenju ugodja), se diskriminacija na osnovi pripadnosti biološki vrsti, imenovana specizem, kot vsakokratni družbeni konstrukt obnavlja skozi celotno kulturno zgodovino. Sistemsko osvoboditev vseh živali bi kazalo zgraditi na temelju razširjene teorije človekovih pravic, kjer je edino pomembno vključitveno merilo, ki prestane tudi poskuse kritik empirične analize, dejstvo, da je določen individuum intencionalno bitje, ki ima interese in jih želi zadovoljiti. Za vstop v to območje torej ni pomembna nobena druga kognitivna kvaliteta (kot je razum, govor in samozavedanje) kot preprosto dejstvo, da določeno bitje doživlja občutke in se nanje odziva. Pogoj intencionalnosti je torej minimalni kriterij za določitev moralne (in posledično pravne) subjektivnosti, odpravo lastninskega statusa nečloveških živali ter postuliranja njim imanentnih pravic. Takšen model enake obravnave pravic vseh živali bi temeljil na upoštevanju primerjalnih kriterijev za vstop na območje podeljenega polnopravnega članstva v moralni skupnosti, t.j. zgolj na upoštevanju kriterija zavesti kot edinega empirično dokazljivega kriterija, v analogiji s podeljevanjem moralnega statusa mejnim primerom človeških osebnosti. Razširitev obstoječe moralne paradigme tudi na področje priznanja pravic nečloveškim živalim (oziroma vsaj veliki večini njih) bi torej – z ustreznim etično- in pravno-filozofskim argumentiranjem – bila izvedljiv korak, drugo vprašanje pa je aplikacija takšne teorije na širšo družbeno raven, saj bi se konkretizirala v odpravi lastninske paradigme nečloveških živali. Ali je in v kolikšni meri je družba, ki se nahaja v primežu globalizacijske krize družbenih vrednot, pripravljena na tako spremembo, je nemogoče oceniti. Dejstvo pa ostaja, da ne moremo pričakovati, da se bodo dejanske spremembe v položaju nečloveških živali začele dogajati v filozofiji prava ali v normodajnem postopku, temveč se morajo prvi premiki (spomnimo na družbena gibanja na področju rasne in spolne emancipacije) zgoditi v zavesti posameznika. Le-ta je skupaj z drugimi posamezniki lahko dejanski snovalec politik določene družbe.

Keywords

pravni subjekt;pravna subjektiviteta;pravice živali;enakovredna obravnava;inherentna vrednost;specizem;diplomska dela;

Data

Language:	Slovenian
Year of publishing:	2016
Typology:	2.11 - Undergraduate Thesis
Organization:	UM PF - Faculty of Law
Publisher:	[K. Semprimožnik]
UDC:	341.2(043.2)
COBISS:	5116971
Views:	1212
Downloads:	205
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	English
Secondary title:	Model of legal subjectivity for animals
Secondary abstract:	The law is an expression of consensus in a specific culturally-civilized society, which is why its every construct must be assessed in a broader sociopolitical context. Just as escalating the notion of human rights is related to specific social climates in the legal worlds in which the discourse on natural, inseparable value of a human found its place, so it is necessary that a possibility of the founding of an institute of nonhuman animal rights is built upon the theoretical foundation of the legal status of an individual nonhuman animal. It will, of course, be necessary to first re-examine the established mental patterns in the context of other sciences (ethics, philosophy, sociology, anthropology), where serious discussions about the transformation of inter-species relationships are already underway, however, the legal position can also contribute to the process of liberation of all animals. Due to the historic antropocentric moral prejudice, the current legal status of nonhuman animals is highly unjust. In the western moral paradigm only people have a legally binding moral status, which gives them basic moral protection, while other animals are reduced to the rudimentary level of instrumental value in human causes, as manifested in a lack of any moral status being recognized to them. Mechanisms established to protect their integrity are reduced to a minimum and are primarily intended to prevent unnecessary human cruelty towards them. Since its beginnings, the evolutionary biology has been unable to prove any distinction in organic structure of human and nonhuman animals which could cause them to sense differently (both human and nonhuman animals in their unique ways show interest to avoid pain and seek wellbeing). Despite this, the discrimination based on being part of a biological species, called speciesizm, repeates itself as the respective social construct throughout the entire cultural history. Systematic liberation of all animals should be built on the basis of an extended theory of human rights, where the only important inclusive measure withstanding even the attempts of criticism by empirical analysis is the fact that a particular individual is an intentional creature with interests which it seeks to satisfy. Thus, aside the simple fact of a particular being experiencing feelings and responding accordingly, no other cognitive quality is important (such as ratio, speech or self-awareness). Intentionality is therefore a nominal criterion to determine moral (and consequently legal) subjectivity, eliminate the property status of nonhuman animals and to postulate their intrinsic rights. Such a model of equal treatment of rights of all animals would be based on taking into the account the comparative criteria for obtaining full membership in the moral community, i.e. solely on the account of the criterion of awareness as the only empirically provable criterion, analogous to granting of moral status to the boundary cases of human personalities. Extending the existing moral paradigm to recognizing the rights of nonhuman animals (or at least of the vast majority of them) would then be – with the appropriate ethical and legal-philosophical justification – a viable step. However, applying such a theory to a broader social level is another question altogether, for it would be manifested in the abolition of the notion of nonhuman animals as property. Whether and to what extent the society in the grip of global crisis of social values is ready for such a change is impossible to predict. But the fact remains that in the philosophy of law or in the legisltative procedure, we cannot expect to see a real change in the status of nonhuman animals; remembering the social movements in areas of racial and gender emancipation the changes have to start in the consciousness of the individuals first. Only this may be the actual instigator of policies in a society.
Secondary keywords:	legal subject;legal subjectivity;animal rights;equal treatment;inherent value;speciesism;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Undergraduate thesis
Thesis comment:	Univ. v Mariboru, Pravna fak.
Pages:	49 f.
ID:	9149841