Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility

Xiaojie Chen (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resources that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.

Ključne besede

socialna dilema;evolucijske igre;javne dobrine;izobilje;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;social dilemma;evolutionary games;public goods;abundance;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2014
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK:	53
COBISS:	20361736
ISSN:	2045-2322
Št. ogledov:	1236
Št. prenosov:	344
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede:	socialna dilema;evolucijske igre;javne dobrine;izobilje;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Znanstveno delo
Strani:	str. 1-5
Letnik:	ǂVol. ǂ4
Zvezek:	ǂart. no. ǂ4161
Čas izdaje:	2014
DOI:	10.1038/srep04161
ID:	10844195