magistrsko delo
Iris Štelcar (Avtor), Petra Weingerl (Mentor)

Povzetek

Magistrsko delo z analizo sodne prakse Sodišča EU proučuje vprašanje horizontalnega neposrednega učinka določb Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah. Od uveljavitve Lizbonske pogodbe je Listina del primarne zakonodaje EU. Glede na možnost neposrednega sklicevanja na določbe ustanovnih pogodb EU v primeru spora med posamezniki se odpira vprašanje, ali se lahko temeljna načela prava EU, ki jih je Sodišče EU razvilo na tem področju, uporabijo tudi za določbe Listine. Ključno vprašanje je, ali lahko imajo tudi določbe Listine neposredni učinek, ki ga je Sodišče EU že v zadevi 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, priznalo pravicam, ki izhajajo iz primarnega prava EU. To vprašanje je izjemno zanimivo glede horizontalnega neposrednega učinka določb Listine, še posebej v luči dejstva, da so bile temeljne pravice tradicionalno razumljene kot ščit posameznikov proti državi in ne proti drugim posameznikom. Izhodiščno težavo povzroča 51. člen Listine, ki kot naslovnike, ki jih zavezujejo njene določbe, ob institucijah EU in državah članicah izrecno ne predvideva tudi posameznikov. Z namenom okrepitve varstva temeljnih pravic v EU je Sodišče EU zavrnilo restriktivno razlago omenjene določbe in pravicam iz Listine, ki so dovolj kakovostne, dopustilo horizontalni neposredni učinek. Ta odločitev še ne pomeni, da se lahko vsi posamezniki v zasebnopravnem sporu sklicujejo na katerokoli temeljno pravico iz Listine, ampak mora le-ta biti samozadostna in zavezujoča. Če je namreč konkretna določba zavezujočega značaja, jasna in nepogojna, je zato, da bi se lahko posamezniki v medsebojnem sporu sklicevali nanjo, ni treba konkretizirati z določbami prava EU ali nacionalnega prava. Odločilen vpliv na obravnavan razvoj sodne prakse sta imeli združeni zadevi C-569/16 in C-570/16, Bauer et al, kjer se je vprašanje horizontalnega neposrednega učinka drugega odstavka 31. člena Listine pojavilo zaradi nepravilnega prenosa 7. člena Direktive 2003/88 v nemški pravni red. Ta sodba Sodišča EU daje nacionalnim sodiščem novo evropsko razsežnost, saj bodo morali sodniki v določenih okoliščinah nacionalno zakonodajo "dati na stran", da bi zagotovili učinkovito varstvo pravic iz Listine.

Ključne besede

primarno pravo Evropske unije;Listina EU o temeljnih pravicah;temeljne socialne pravice;horizontalni neposredni učinek;združeni zadevi C-569/16 in C-570/16;Bauer et al.;

Podatki

Jezik: Slovenski jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 2.09 - Magistrsko delo
Organizacija: UM PF - Pravna fakulteta
Založnik: I. Štelcar]
UDK: 341:347.12(043.3)
COBISS: 5821995 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
Št. ogledov: 927
Št. prenosov: 235
Ocena: 0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik: Angleški jezik
Sekundarni naslov: Horizontal direct effect of provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU within the scope of recent case law of the Court of Justice of the EU
Sekundarni povzetek: The thesis examines the horizontal direct effect of the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU by analysing the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter has been part of EU primary law. Given the possibility of directly relying on the provisions of the founding Treaties of the EU in the event of a dispute between individuals, the question arises as to whether the fundamental principles of EU law developed in this field by the Court of Justice of the EU can also be applied to the provisions of the Charter. The key question is whether the provisions of the Charter can also have a direct effect, granted by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, for rights stemming from EU primary law. This question is extremely interesting with regard to the horizontal direct effect of the provisions of the Charter, especially in light of the fact that fundamental rights have traditionally been understood as protecting individuals against the state and not against other individuals. The core problem is caused by Article 51 of the Charter, which does not explicitly envisage individuals as addressees bound by its provisions alongside the EU institutions and Member States. In order to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, the Court of Justice of the EU rejected a restrictive interpretation of the abovementioned provision and allowed the Charter rights of sufficient quality to have horizontal direct effect. This decision does not mean that all individuals in a private law dispute can invoke any of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, but must be self-sufficient and binding. If a specific provision of a binding nature is clear and unconditional, it is unnecessary to concretize it with the provisions of EU or national law in order for individuals to be able to rely on it in a private law dispute. A significant impact on developments in the case-law have had the Joined cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Bauer et al, where the question of the horizontal direct effect of Article 31 (2) of the Charter arose from the incorrect transposition of Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 into the German law. The judgment of the Court of Justice of EU gives national courts a new European dimension, as judges will, in certain circumstances, have to put aside national law in order to ensure the effective protection of the rights enshrined in the Charter.
Sekundarne ključne besede: primary law of the European Union;the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;social fundamental rights;horizontal direct effect;joined cases C-569/16 and C-570/16;Bauer et al.;
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Magistrsko delo/naloga
Komentar na gradivo: Univ. v Mariboru, Pravna fak.
Strani: 60 str.
ID: 11235233