doktorska disertacija
Matej Klarič (Avtor), Miroslav Stanojević (Mentor)

Povzetek

Leta 2008 je svet presenetila največja kriza kapitalizma po veliki depresiji s konca dvajsetih in tridesetih let preteklega stoletja. Za veliko večino strokovne javnosti je zadnja kriza pomenila ogromno presenečenje. Na podlagi prevladujočih ekonomskih modelov so namreč domnevali, da do tako velike krize ne bo prišlo nikoli več. Trg naj bi namreč samodejno preprečeval kakršnakoli prevelika nihanja, ki bi lahko vodila v (večjo) krizo. Prav zaradi neomajnega verjetja v učinke prostega trga so bili obseg, globina kot tudi dolgotrajnost krize nepričakovani. Kriza je na glavo postavila celotno teorijo, na kateri so politiki dotlej oblikovali svoje politično-ekonomske usmeritve. Le-te so bile osnovane na neoliberalni ideologiji, ki je vodila v politike deregulacije, privatizacije, nižanja davkov ipd. Tudi tranzicija držav zgodovinskih socializmov v kapitalistična gospodarstva je bila skladno s prevladujočo teorijo, ki je govorila o koncu zgodovine in le eni možni poti, razumljena predvsem kot prehod iz propadlih socialističnih sistemov v večni sistem, kjer vlada prosti trg, ki naj bi bil najboljši možni urejevalec družbeno-ekonomskih nihanj. Tranzicijo so v tem smislu dominantne (ekonomske) predstave povezovale s procesom enosmernega prehoda iz neučinkovitih zgodovinskih socializmov v kapitalistični sistem tržnega gospodarstva kot končnega stadija vseh najbolj razvitih družb. Svetovno-sistemska teorija za razliko od tovrstnih prevladujočih neoklasičnih ekonomskih predstav krize ni razumela v smislu nepričakovanega dogodka. Nasprotno, po tej teoriji so krize neizbežen pojav, ki je posledica kapitalističnih protislovij znotraj posameznih akumulacijskih ciklov. Kot kaže svetovno-sistemska zgodovinska analiza, je bil za vsakega od dosedanjih ciklov značilen vzpon materialnega poslovanja v prvi fazi in preusmerjanje v finančni kapital v drugem delu cikla, ki je obenem v preteklosti znotraj posameznega cikla vedno pomenil tudi zaton hegemonske države. V nasprotju z danes prevladujočimi predstavami nam svetovno-sistemska teorija ponuja dokaze ne le o tem, da so krize neizbežen pojav znotraj kapitalizma, temveč tudi o tem, da doba financializacije, ki je bila značilna za drugo fazo ameriškega akumulacijskega cikla, v zgodovinski perspektivi ne pomeni ničesar novega. Gre le še za eno ciklično ponovitev dveh faz v posameznem ciklu, ki je vsakokrat doslej z razvojem sistema zaobjemala še večji del sveta in večje število akterjev kot v preteklosti. V povezavi s slovensko tranzicijo nas to pripelje do pomembne ugotovitve. Ker je vsako obdobje vzpona finančnega poslovanja, ki se je vedno začelo z 'opozorilno krizo' in svoj konec oznanilo z 'zaključno krizo', pomenilo tudi tranzicijo oziroma transformacijo celotnega sistema v nekaj novega, lahko tudi za obdobje po zadnji 'zaključni krizi' iz leta 2008 sklepamo, da ta oznanja večje globalne spremembe. V tranziciji tako niso zgolj nekdanje socialistične države, temveč celoten sistem, kar na glavo postavi prevladujoče teorije tranzicije, ki uspešnost držav merijo predvsem v prilagajanju neoliberalnim političnim rešitvam ne glede na negativne učinke, ki jih te politike nosijo s seboj. V tem kontekstu nam drugačno razumevanje tranzicije odpre povsem nov pogled na pretekle in aktualne procese v Sloveniji, v ostalih postsocialističnih državah ter tudi drugod po Evropi in svetu. Spremembe niso del neizbežne poti v smeri neoliberalnih reform, temveč same postanejo del problema, ki se v različnih delih sveta odražajo tudi v vse večjih družbenih napetostih, nemirih in novih (predvsem skrajno desnih) političnih grupacijah. Zadnje predstavljajo neposreden odgovor na nezadovoljstvo množic zaradi neizpolnjenih pričakovanj, ki jim jih je obljubljal neoliberalni model kapitalizma. Pričujoča doktorska disertacija zato s pomočjo interdisciplinarne in zgodovinske analize, osnovane na zgoraj omenjenem teoretičnem aparatu, slovensko tranzicijo definira drugače in jo z namenom celovitejšega razumevanja procesov umesti v daljši časovni kontekst – ne le znotraj Slovenije, temveč tudi širše. Procesov v tako medsebojno prepletenem sistemu kot je značilen za globalni kapitalizem ameriškega akumulacijskega cikla, namreč ni mogoče obravnavati ločeno v posamezni državi in znotraj strogo zamejenega časovnega okvira, ki izpušča dolgotrajnejše procese in zgodovino razume kot preprosto nizanje bolj ali manj (ne)povezanih dogodkov. Dosedanjim analizam obdobja slovenske tranzicije (ki obravnavajo predvsem notranje dejavnike obdobja po osamosvojitvi) poleg daljšega pogleda na čas pred obdobjem osamosvojitve dodajamo sistemske dejavnike, povezane s kapitalističnimi akumulacijskimi cikli; pri tem dajemo večji poudarek prav pomenu zunanjih dejavnikov in njihovem vplivu na notranje politično-ekonomsko dogajanje. Zunanji dejavniki in velike strukturne geopolitične spremembe so bili pri proučevanju razpada Jugoslavije praviloma odrinjeni na stran, ponekod pa celo povsem zanemarjeni. V tem pogledu doktorska disertacija ponuja drugačen, celovitejši pogled, upoštevajoč zunanje dejavnike; slovenske posebnosti povezuje s svetovno-sistemskimi akumulacijskimi cikli. V skladu z omenjenim se tranzicija sistema ni začela šele ob osamosvojitvi, temveč že v socialistični Jugoslaviji, kamor so po 'opozorilni krizi' v sedemdesetih letih preteklega stoletja globalni procesi prišli z zamudo v osemdesetih letih. Običajno se o razlogih za razpad Jugoslavije govori predvsem v povezavi s preveliko zadolženostjo države in nacionalističnimi težnjami posameznih držav, ki so z osamosvojitvijo držav izpolnile svoje 'tisočletne sanje'. Nasprotno pa povezava jugoslovanske zgodbe z dogajanjem v mednarodnem okolju pokaže, da so imele veliko vlogo pri razpadu države mednarodne institucije in spremembe v mednarodnem okolju; nastopile so kot neposredna posledica 'opozorilne krize,' ki so ji sledile spremembe v smeri preusmerjanja v finančno poslovanje. Politične odločitve, sprejete v globalnih centrih moči, so pripeljale do ukrepov, ki so v različnih delih sveta poslabšali položaj ljudi. Pogosto je šlo za povsem spregledane spremembe po padcu Brettonwoodskega dogovora (od podražitve zadolževanja, pogojevanja pri odobritvi posojil, do vsiljevanja 'varčevalnih ukrepov'), ki so ob slabšanju situacije v državi naposled ponudile plodovita tla za razrast nacionalizmov v Jugoslaviji. Sledile so krvave vojne, ki se jim je Slovenija izognila s kratko vojno za razliko od nekaterih drugih držav nekdanje Jugoslavije. Slovenska poosamosvojitvena zgodba je bila edinstvena in je odstopala od tranzicijskih procesov v ostalih postsocialističnih državah, ki so bolj ali manj vneto sledile radikalni neoliberalni doktrini šoka. Po letu 1991 se je Slovenija v zgoščenem časovnem obdobju razvijala po vzorcu, značilnem za ameriški svetovno-sistemski akumulacijski cikel, ki je prevladal po koncu druge svetovne vojne. Od leta 1991 do leta 2004 se je Slovenija enako kot Evropa v času po drugi svetovni vojni in vse do sedemdesetih let razvijala v smeri neokorporativnega modela. V to so jo za razliko od ostalih postsocialističnih držav prisilili predvsem močni sindikati, dediščina socializma in proporcionalni volilni sistem, ki je politične stranke silil k upoštevanju širših družbenih interesov in jih usmerjal v sodelovanje za oblikovanja vladnih koalicij. Močni sindikati so vlado lažje prisilili, da je upoštevala njihove interese. Oblikovanje politik je podobno kot v Evropi v času povojnega keynesianizma potekalo na podlagi tripartitnih pogajanj med sindikati, vlado in delodajalci. Politike so temeljile na zagovarjanju polne zaposlenosti, rasti plač ipd. Slovenija je v tem času dosegala zavidljive rezultate, ki so jih nekateri, predvsem zaradi pozitivnih ekonomskih kazalcev opisovali kot zgodbo o uspehu. Z vstopom v EU leta 2004 je obstoječi model razvoja prišel do svojega konca. Na volitvah je še istega leta zmagala desna sredina in prišlo je do preobrata v politiki vlade, ki je začela bolj radikalno slediti neoliberalni doktrini. Obrat je bil podoben tistemu, ki se je po 'opozorilni krizi' zgodil na Zahodu že ob koncu sedemdesetih let, le da so bili vzroki za spremembe takrat nekoliko drugačni. Če so spremembe na globalni ravni potekale zaradi krize ameriškega akumulacijskega cikla, ki so sistem silile v fazo financializacije, je ta sprememba v Sloveniji potekala predvsem zaradi zunanjih dejavnikov, ki so državo silili v sprejemanje ukrepov za vstop v EU in v območje evra. Država je s tem izgubila nekatere makroekonomske vzvode na fiskalnem in monetarnem področju (carine, možnost avtonomne kontrole količine denarja v obtoku in še posebej mehanizem za devalvacijo lastne valute). Omenjeni mehanizmi so ji pred tem omogočali vodenje avtonomnih keynesianskih politik. Slovenija je bila navedene politike prisiljena opustiti predvsem zaradi omenjenih strukturnih sprememb, ki so bile posledica vstopa v EU in upoštevanja njenih neoliberalnih pravil, zapisanih v EU dokumentih. S tem je izgubila del suverenosti, čeprav je bila prav pridobitev le-te eden glavnih razlogov za njeno osamosvojitev. Sindikati so z velikimi protesti novembra 2005 (ponovno) preprečili radikalno izvedbo neoliberalnih reform desne Janševe vlade, ki je prevzela oblast po dolgotrajni vladavini LDS. V tem času je po vstopu v območje evra in ob pomanjkanju ukrepov, ki bi preprečili pregrevanje gospodarstva ter pretirano zadolževanje v tujini, prišlo do enormnega povečanja zunanjega dolga. Bruto zunanji dolg države se je namreč v štirih letih do konca leta 2008 podvojil. Zaradi nespametnih reform, ki so znižale stopnjo obdavčitve najbogatejših, se je obenem povečeval tudi javni dolg. Ko je leta 2008 nastopila kriza, se vladajoči, podobno kot strokovnjaki in politiki na Zahodu, niso zavedali njene razsežnosti in dolgotrajne (strukturne) narave. Nepripravljenost na krizo se je kazala tudi v politikah, ki so jih po letu 2008 vodile slovenske vlade. Janševo vlado je leta 2008 nasledila Pahorjeva. Tudi ta je sledila neoliberalnim politikam, ki so takrat temeljile na 'varčevalnih ukrepih' in bile uperjene predvsem proti najrevnejšim slojem. Zaradi prepočasnega in neustreznega ukrepanja, ki je vodilo v zmanjšanje povpraševanja, je bila nižja tudi gospodarska rast. V času najhujše krize so se v Sloveniji sicer izmenjale tri vlade; na predčasnih volitvah so po Pahorjevi vladi zmagovali novi obrazi z (neuresničenimi) obljubami, da bodo vodili drugačne politike. Nezadovoljstvo s politiko je bilo zaradi naraščanja brezposelnosti, revščine, nižanja pokojnin, plač ter ostalih prejemkov veliko. A različne vlade so še vedno vodile bolj ali manj radikalne neoliberalne politike, ki so jih ob vse dražjem zadolževanju vsiljevale mednarodne (še posebej evropske) institucije. Prostor za drugačne politike je bil tako še bolj zaprt kot po vstopu v območje evra. Kriza se je začela umirjati šele konec leta 2014. Od takrat je Slovenija beležila eno izmed najvišjih rasti znotraj EU, od česar pa je imela ob naraščanju neenakosti korist predvsem najpremožnejša manjšina prebivalstva. Ne glede na vzpodbudne gospodarske trende in umiritev razmer v Sloveniji se globalne in regionalne napetosti zaradi krize ameriškega akumulacijskega cikla ne umirjajo. Vse večjo priljubljenost, podobno kot v času krize britanskega akumulacijskega cikla, vnovič v nekoliko spremenjenih pogojih doživljajo skrajno desne politike, ki tokrat glavnega krivca za težave, ki jih proizvaja sistem, vidijo v migracijah. Kriza sistema pa v drugem delu obdobja ameriškega akumulacijskega cikla napoveduje večje spremembe, ki bodo slej ko prej končale hegemonijo neoliberalizma. Na globalni ravni se s krhanjem neoliberalnega konsenza in z zatonom ameriške moči tako napoveduje korenitejši preobrat. Tudi tranzicija lahko v tem kontekstu razumemo širše kot doslej. V njej se ne nahaja samo Slovenija, temveč celoten svetovni sistem. Pri tem se odpira ključno vprašanje prihodnjega razvoja – ne samo Slovenije, temveč celotnega sveta. Zaradi številnih dejavnikov je nemogoče napovedati, v katero smer bodo procesi vodili v prihodnje. Slovenija je v njih le majhen akter, ki pa bi se moral zavedati prihodnjih sprememb in se na njih premišljeno odzivati. Kako se bo tranzicija odrazila v Sloveniji, bo odvisno od značilnosti slovenskega akumulacijskega cikla in njegovih strukturnih šibkosti. Glede na zgodovinske izkušnje smo precej verjetno priča koncu ameriške hegemonije znotraj kapitalizma. Kapitalističen sistem pa bi lahko dolgoročno obstal, v kolikor bi prišlo do novega akumulacijskega cikla z novim hegemonom, ki bi nasledil ZDA. Povsem mogoč pa je tudi razplet, po katerem bomo priča koncu kapitalizma in drugačnemu sistemu, za katerega nikakor ni nujno, da bo bolj egalitaren od kapitalističnega.

Ključne besede

slovenska tranzicija;svetovno-sistemska analiza;ameriški akumulacijski cikel;keynesianizem;neoklasična ekonomija;Ekonomske krize;Doktorske disertacije;

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Jezik: Slovenski jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 2.08 - Doktorska disertacija
Organizacija: UL FDV - Fakulteta za družbene vede
Založnik: [M. Klarič]
UDK: 330.1(043.2)
COBISS: 91933187 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
Št. ogledov: 267
Št. prenosov: 105
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Sekundarni jezik: Angleški jezik
Sekundarni naslov: Slovenian Transition within the Crisis of the World-Systems Cycle of Accumulation
Sekundarni povzetek: In 2008, the world was shaken by the biggest crisis of capitalism since the Great Depression of the late 1920s and 1930s. For most of the expert community, it was a massively unexpected event, as the leading economic models had assumed no crisis of such magnitude could ever again be possible; indeed, the market was expected to automatically prevent any excessive fluctuations that could lead to it. Thus, due to the unwavering belief in the power of the free market, the sheer scope, depth, and duration of the crisis were completely unforeseen. Moreover, the 2008 crisis turned upside down the very theory on which politicians had shaped their political-economic orientations, i.e., the neoliberal ideology that promoted the policies of deregulation, privatization, tax cuts, etc. Similarly, in line with the theory of the end of history and of only one possible path, the transition of the formerly socialist countries into capitalist economies was understood mostly as a transition from the failed socialist systems to the timeless system ruled by the free market. The latter was believed to be the best possible regulator of socio-economic fluctuations. In this sense, the dominant (economic) ideas associated transition with a process of a one-way transition from inefficient historical socialisms to the capitalist system of a market economy as the final stage of all societies developed to their highest stage. Unlike in the case of the dominant neoclassical economic theories outlined above, the crisis did not come as a shock to the World-Systems Theory. Rather, the latter see crises as an inevitable phenomenon, resulting from capitalist contradictions within individual cycles of accumulation. As historical analysis demonstrates, each of the cycles so far has been characterized in its first phase by material expansion, and in its second phase, by a shift to financial capital. In the past, the second phase also always simultaneously meant a decline of the hegemonic state within an individual cycle. Contrary to the dominant ideas of today, the World-System Theory offers evidence not only of the inevitable nature of crises in capitalism, but also of the fact that the period of financialization that has characterized the second phase of the American accumulation cycle is nothing new when seen from the historical perspective. On the contrary, it is just another cyclical repetition of the two phases in a single cycle that has thus far, every time progressed to encompassing an ever-greater part of the world and more actors than before. In relation to the Slovene transition, this leads to an important finding. Since every period of financial expansion, which always started with a signal crisis and announced its ending with a terminal crisis, also meant a transition or in other words, a transformation of the whole system into something new, it can be argued that the period since the most recent terminal crisis of 2008 can likewise be considered an indicator of major global changes underway. This means that not only former socialist countries, but the whole system is in a transition – turning upside down the leading theories of transition that measure countries’ success mostly by their adaptation to neoliberal political solutions, regardless of the negative effects those policies bring along. In this context, a different understanding of transition opens a new perspective of the past and current processes in Slovenia, in other post-socialist countries, as well as elsewhere in Europe, and the world. Seen in this way, the occurring changes are no longer part of an inevitable path in the direction of neoliberal reforms, but are themselves part of a problem, reflected in different parts of the world in ever-increasing social tensions, unrest and new (especially far-right) political groupings; a direct response to the dissatisfaction of the masses, their unfulfilled expectations and promises broken by the neoliberal model of capitalism. Thus, through interdisciplinary and historical analysis based on the above-described theoretical apparatus, this doctoral dissertation defines the Slovene transition differently, placing it in a larger timeframe, to obtain a more holistic understanding of the processes taking place not only in Slovenia but also more broadly. The processes in a system as interconnected as the global capitalism of the American accumulation cycle namely cannot be treated separately, limited to a single country, and within a strictly confined timeframe that leaves out more long-term processes, understanding history only as a series of related events. Therefore, apart from taking into consideration a longer period leading to Slovenia’s independence, systemic factors related to capitalist systemic cycles of accumulation have also been added to the existing analyses of the country’s transition (that mostly deal with internal factors in the post-independence period), while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of external factors on internal political-economic developments, based on a broader perspective. Notably, external factors and major structural geopolitical changes tend to be pushed to the side or completely neglected when it comes to analyses of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. In this aspect, this doctoral dissertation offers a different, more comprehensive perspective that considers and relates the external factors to the systemic cycles of accumulation, while simultaneously taking note of the particularities of the Slovene situation. Considering these points, the transition of the system had not only begun with independence but already in socialist Yugoslavia, when the latter was in the 1980s reached with a delay, by the global processes of the 1970s signal crisis. Typically, the reasons for the breakup of Yugoslavia tend to be discussed mostly in relation to its over-indebtedness and the nationalist aspirations of its individual states, which through the gaining of independence essentially fulfilled their 'thousand-year dream.' Notwithstanding, seen in relation to the developments in the international environment, the story of Yugoslavia indicates that international institutions and the changes in the international environment directly resulting from the signalling crisis, and followed by the shift to financialization, played an important role in Yugoslavia’s breakdown. Political decisions taken in the centers of global power led to measures that caused a deterioration in the situation for people in various parts of the world. Often these changes that followed the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement (from an increase in the cost of borrowing, to conditions attached to loan approval, and the imposition of austerity measures which, with the deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia, provided fertile ground for the expansion of nationalisms in the country) are completely overlooked. The bloody Balkan wars ensued, which unlike some other states of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia managed to avoid with only a brief war. The Slovene post-independence story was unique and deviated from the transition processes in the rest of the post-socialist states, which fervently followed the radical neoliberal shock doctrine. In a concentrated period after 1991, Slovenia was developing in line with the paradigm typical of the US systemic cycle of accumulation that prevailed after WW2. From 1991 to 2004, akin to Europe in WW2’s aftermath and up until the 1970s, Slovenia was developing in line with the neo-corporate model. Unlike other post-socialist states, it was pushed into this direction especially by strong trade unions, by the legacy of socialism, and the electoral system based on proportional representation, which forced political parties into considering wider social interests, and directed them to cooperate to form government coalitions. The power of the trade unions thus made it easier for them to compel the government to take their interests into consideration. Just like in Europe in the times of post-war Keynesianism, policy formation would take place based on tripartite negotiations between trade unions, the government, and employers. Moreover, the policies were based on promoting full employment, wage growth, and similar. Notably, this was the time when Slovenia was achieving enviable results that were sometimes described as a success story, mainly due to positive economic indicators. Nonetheless, this changed with Slovenia’s accession to the EU in 2004, when the above-described development model came to an end. That year’s elections were marked by a victory of a center-right coalition and a turn to the neoliberal doctrine in the government policy. The shift resembled the one occurring in the 1970s in the West, after the signaling crisis, albeit for slightly different reasons. While at the global level, the cause of the changes taking place was the crisis of the US systemic cycle of accumulation that pushed the system into the phase of financialization, in Slovenia that change was caused primarily by the external factors pressing the country to pass the measures required for the accession to the EU and the eurozone. Slovenia lost some of its macroeconomic mechanisms in the fiscal and monetary areas (customs tariffs, the tools to drive inflation, and especially the mechanism for currency devaluation). Before, these tools made it possible for it to pursue autonomous Keynesian policies. Nevertheless, in large part due to these structural changes resulting from the country becoming part of the EU, and thus complying with the neoliberal rules enshrined in its documents, these mechanisms had to be abandoned. Thus, Slovenia lost a part of its sovereignty – even though the latter was one of the main motivations for its move to independence. At the height of the crisis, there was a string of short-lived governments; each early election brought with it fresh faces with new (unfulfilled) promises of different policies. The general state of frustration with politics was strong, due to rising unemployment and poverty, and shrinking pensions, wages, and other benefits. Nevertheless, different governments were still pursuing the path of radical neoliberal policies that were, along with increasingly more expensive borrowing, imposed by international (particularly European) institutions. In such circumstances, the space for different policies was even more limited than after Slovenia joined the eurozone. The crisis only began to subside by the end of 2014. Since then, Slovenia has recorded one of the highest growth rates in the EU, however, this has only benefited a well-off minority of the population. Despite the encouraging economic trends and the normalization of the situation in Slovenia, global and regional tensions arising from the crisis of the US systemic cycle of accumulation have not subsided. Far-right policies that point to migrations as the main culprit for the systemic problems are again experiencing an ever-increasing rise in popularity, like the crisis times of the British systemic cycle of accumulation, albeit in slightly changed circumstances. As has been noted, the systemic crisis heralds major changes in the second phase of the US systemic cycle of accumulation that will sooner or later bring an end to the hegemony of neoliberalism. Indeed, at the global level, the crumbling of the neoliberal consensus and the decline of American power can be seen as a prediction of a more radical turn. In this context, the transition can be understood from a much broader perspective. It involves not only Slovenia but the entire world-system. This further raises a key question about the future development of not only Slovenia but of the whole world. Due to numerous factors, it is impossible to predict what direction these processes will lead in the future. In these developments, Slovenia is only a small actor that should be aware of the changes and respond to them prudently. The way in which the transition will affect it will depend on the characteristics of the Slovene systemic cycle of accumulation and its structural weaknesses. Given the historical experience, it is very likely that we are witnessing the end of US hegemony within capitalism. While the capitalist system could persist, if a new systemic cycle of accumulation takes place, with a new hegemon replacing the USA, there is another perfectly possible outcome: the end of capitalism, and the rise of a different system, not necessarily more egalitarian.
Sekundarne ključne besede: Slovenian transition;world-systems analysis;US Systemic Cycle of Accumulation;Keynesianism;neoclassical economy;Ekonomija;Economics;Neoliberalizem;Neoliberalism;Kapitalizem;Capitalism;Economic crises;Slovenija;Slovenia;Doctoral dissertations;
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Doktorsko delo/naloga
Študijski program: 0
Komentar na gradivo: Univ. v Ljubljani, Fak. za družbene vede
Strani: 341 str.
ID: 14196172