Transition from Gaussian to Levy distributions of stochastic payoff variations in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Povzetek

We study the impact of stochastic payoff variations with different distributions on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We find that Gaussian-distributed payoff variations are most successful in promoting cooperation irrespective of the temptation to defect. In particular, the facilitative effect of noise on the evolution of cooperation decreases steadily as the frequency of rare events increases. Findings are explained via an analysis of local payoff ranking violations. The relevance of results for economics and sociology is discussed.

Ključne besede

stohastični sistemi;prostorska resonanca;reševanje problemov;nelinearni sistemi;hrup;prostorska dinamika;matematični modeli;teorija iger;stochastic systems;spatial resonance;stochastic payoff variations;nonlinear systems;noise;spatial dynamics;mathematical models;prisoner's dilemma;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2007
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK:	519.2
COBISS:	15227656
ISSN:	1539-3755
Št. ogledov:	1591
Št. prenosov:	79
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Angleški jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede:	stohastični sistemi;prostorska resonanca;reševanje problemov;nelinearni sistemi;hrup;prostorska dinamika;matematični modeli;teorija iger;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Strani:	str. 022101-1-022101-4
Letnik:	75
Zvezek:	2
Čas izdaje:	2007
ID:	8724106