Attila Szolnoki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner%s dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion regardless of game parametrization, myopic updating gives rise to the coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficiently large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is heterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a result of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge and coarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly, extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutral drift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners, cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield a five-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and the structure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected mechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.

Keywords

socialna dilema;evolucijske igre;kolektivni pojav;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;social dilemma;evolutionary games;collective phenomena;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Data

Language: English
Year of publishing:
Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization: UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC: 53
COBISS: 20696072 Link will open in a new window
ISSN: 2045-2322
Views: 677
Downloads: 307
Average score: 0 (0 votes)
Metadata: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Other data

Secondary language: Slovenian
Secondary keywords: socialna dilema;evolucijske igre;kolektivni pojav;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS): Scientific work
Pages: str. 1-6
Volume: ǂVol. ǂ4
Issue: ǂart. no. ǂ5496
Chronology: 2014
DOI: 10.1038/srep05496
ID: 10844191