Zhen Wang (Avtor), Attila Szolnoki (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.

Ključne besede

koevolucija;kooperacija;soodvisne mreže;evolucijske igre;kolektivni pojav;samoorganizacija;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;coevolution;cooperation;interdependent networks;evolutionary games;collective phenomena;self-organization;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Podatki

Jezik: Angleški jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija: UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK: 53
COBISS: 20456200 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
ISSN: 1367-2630
Št. ogledov: 1242
Št. prenosov: 405
Ocena: 0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik: Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede: koevolucija;kooperacija;soodvisne mreže;evolucijske igre;kolektivni pojav;samoorganizacija;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Članek v reviji
Strani: str. 033041-1-033041-14
Letnik: ǂVol. ǂ16
Zvezek: ǂiss. ǂ3
Čas izdaje: 2014
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/16/3/033041
ID: 10846209