Zhen Wang (Author), Attila Szolnoki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

Spatial reciprocity is a well known tour de force of cooperation promotion. A thorough understanding of the effects of different population densities is therefore crucial. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas on different interaction graphs with a certain fraction of vacant nodes. We find that sparsity may favor the resolution of social dilemmas, especially if the population density is close to the percolation threshold of the underlying graph. Regardless of the type of the governing social dilemma as well as particularities of the interaction graph, we show that under pairwise imitation the percolation threshold is a universal indicator of how dense the occupancy ought to be for cooperation to be optimally promoted. We also demonstrate that myopic updating, due to the lack of efficient spread of information via imitation, renders the reported mechanism dysfunctional, which in turn further strengthens its foundations.

Keywords

kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;cooperation;public goods;punishment;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Data

Language: English
Year of publishing:
Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization: UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC: 530.16
COBISS: 19099656 Link will open in a new window
ISSN: 2045-2322
Views: 781
Downloads: 318
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Other data

Secondary language: Slovenian
Secondary keywords: kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS): Scientific work
Pages: 6 str.
Volume: ǂVol. ǂ2
Issue: ǂart. no. ǂ369
Chronology: 2012
DOI: 10.1038/srep00369
ID: 10844197