Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas

Attila Szolnoki (Avtor), Zhen Wang (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show that plugging into the wisdom of groups strongly promotes cooperative behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain this by revealing a dynamically decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently invade cooperators. This in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity and establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving social dilemmas.

Ključne besede

kooperacija;javne dobrine;masovno znanje;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;cooperation;public goods;wisdom of crowds;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2012
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK:	53
COBISS:	19321096
ISSN:	2045-2322
Št. ogledov:	912
Št. prenosov:	302
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede:	kooperacija;javne dobrine;masovno znanje;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Znanstveno delo
Strani:	6 str.
Letnik:	ǂVol. ǂ2
Zvezek:	ǂart. no. ǂ576
Čas izdaje:	2012
DOI:	10.1038/srep00576
ID:	10844211