Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Abstract

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.

Keywords

kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;institucije;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;cooperation;public goods;punishment;institutions;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2012
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC:	530.16
COBISS:	19071752
ISSN:	2045-2322
Views:	943
Downloads:	313
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;institucije;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Scientific work
Pages:	6 str.
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ2
Issue:	ǂart. no. ǂ344
Chronology:	2012
DOI:	10.1038/srep00344
ID:	10844209