Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding

Attila Szolnoki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

Our well-being depends on both our personal success and the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation an essential trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remains elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly rich social dynamics that explain why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding, coming from over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite its success, rewarding is not as firmly embedded into our societal organization as punishment.

Keywords

kooperacija;javne dobrine;nagrada;kazen;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;cooperation;public goods;reward;punishment;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2012
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC:	53
COBISS:	19323144
ISSN:	1367-2630
Views:	1533
Downloads:	397
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	kooperacija;javne dobrine;nagrada;kazen;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Article
Pages:	str. 093016-1-093016-14
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ14
Issue:	ǂiss. ǂ9
Chronology:	2012
DOI:	10.1088/1367-2630/14/9/093016
ID:	10845305