Self-organization of punishment in structured populations

Matjaž Perc (Author), Attila Szolnoki (Author)

Abstract

Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bear additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both the spontaneous emergence of punishment and its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. The results presented indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.

Keywords

kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;cooperation;public goods;punishment;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2012
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC:	530.16
COBISS:	19100424
ISSN:	1367-2630
Views:	1093
Downloads:	410
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Article
Pages:	str. 043013-1-043013-13
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ14
Issue:	ǂiss. ǂ4
Chronology:	2012
DOI:	10.1088/1367-2630/14/4/043013
ID:	10846208