Zhen Wang (Author), Attila Szolnoki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.

Keywords

koevolucija;kooperacija;soodvisne mreže;evolucijske igre;kolektivni pojav;samoorganizacija;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;coevolution;cooperation;interdependent networks;evolutionary games;collective phenomena;self-organization;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Data

Language: English
Year of publishing:
Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization: UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC: 53
COBISS: 20456200 Link will open in a new window
ISSN: 1367-2630
Views: 1242
Downloads: 405
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Other data

Secondary language: Slovenian
Secondary keywords: koevolucija;kooperacija;soodvisne mreže;evolucijske igre;kolektivni pojav;samoorganizacija;fazni prehodi;fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS): Article
Pages: str. 033041-1-033041-14
Volume: ǂVol. ǂ16
Issue: ǂiss. ǂ3
Chronology: 2014
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/16/3/033041
ID: 10846209