Belief without representation

Abstract

In this article, I set off to explore the question “What is belief?” from a first-person perspective. Finding the explanations in analytical philosophy insufficient, I delve into the phenomenological tradition – starting with Edmund Husserl’s concept of the horizon. In doing so, I find that the phenomenological tradition seems to contradict the presupposition of beliefs as representations. Directing my attention to finding an alternative explanation, I present Hubert Dreyfus’ explanation of learning without representations, but show that (by Dreyfus’ own admission) he does not truly take a decisive step away from representationalism. I present the idea of enaction as a proper alternative to representations. Within this new framework, I present the idea of sense-making as a potential direction towards an answer to the question at hand.

Keywords

prepričanja;ravnanje;fenomenologija;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2017
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UL PEF - Faculty of Education
Publisher:	Zagreb : Znanost.org society
UDC:	165.242
COBISS:	11887177
ISSN:	1334-4676
Views:	1400
Downloads:	269
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	consciousness;zavest;
File type:	application/pdf
Type (COBISS):	Article
Pages:	str. 242-250
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ15
Issue:	ǂissue ǂ4
Chronology:	2017
DOI:	10.7906/indecs.15.4.2
ID:	10895640