Belief without representation

Povzetek

In this article, I set off to explore the question “What is belief?” from a first-person perspective. Finding the explanations in analytical philosophy insufficient, I delve into the phenomenological tradition – starting with Edmund Husserl’s concept of the horizon. In doing so, I find that the phenomenological tradition seems to contradict the presupposition of beliefs as representations. Directing my attention to finding an alternative explanation, I present Hubert Dreyfus’ explanation of learning without representations, but show that (by Dreyfus’ own admission) he does not truly take a decisive step away from representationalism. I present the idea of enaction as a proper alternative to representations. Within this new framework, I present the idea of sense-making as a potential direction towards an answer to the question at hand.

Ključne besede

prepričanja;ravnanje;fenomenologija;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2017
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UL PEF - Pedagoška fakulteta
Založnik:	Zagreb : Znanost.org society
UDK:	165.242
COBISS:	11887177
ISSN:	1334-4676
Št. ogledov:	1400
Št. prenosov:	269
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede:	consciousness;zavest;
Vrsta datoteke:	application/pdf
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Članek v reviji
Strani:	str. 242-250
Letnik:	ǂVol. ǂ15
Zvezek:	ǂissue ǂ4
Čas izdaje:	2017
DOI:	10.7906/indecs.15.4.2
ID:	10895640