If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation

Zhen Wang (Avtor), Attila Szolnoki (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

Spatial reciprocity is a well known tour de force of cooperation promotion. A thorough understanding of the effects of different population densities is therefore crucial. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas on different interaction graphs with a certain fraction of vacant nodes. We find that sparsity may favor the resolution of social dilemmas, especially if the population density is close to the percolation threshold of the underlying graph. Regardless of the type of the governing social dilemma as well as particularities of the interaction graph, we show that under pairwise imitation the percolation threshold is a universal indicator of how dense the occupancy ought to be for cooperation to be optimally promoted. We also demonstrate that myopic updating, due to the lack of efficient spread of information via imitation, renders the reported mechanism dysfunctional, which in turn further strengthens its foundations.

Ključne besede

kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;cooperation;public goods;punishment;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2012
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK:	530.16
COBISS:	19099656
ISSN:	2045-2322
Št. ogledov:	781
Št. prenosov:	318
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede:	kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Znanstveno delo
Strani:	6 str.
Letnik:	ǂVol. ǂ2
Zvezek:	ǂart. no. ǂ369
Čas izdaje:	2012
DOI:	10.1038/srep00369
ID:	10844197