Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Povzetek

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.

Ključne besede

kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;institucije;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;cooperation;public goods;punishment;institutions;phase transitions;physics of social systems;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2012
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK:	530.16
COBISS:	19071752
ISSN:	2045-2322
Št. ogledov:	943
Št. prenosov:	313
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede:	kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;institucije;fazni prehodi;fizika socialnih sistemov;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Znanstveno delo
Strani:	6 str.
Letnik:	ǂVol. ǂ2
Zvezek:	ǂart. no. ǂ344
Čas izdaje:	2012
DOI:	10.1038/srep00344
ID:	10844209