Rabati v konkurenčnem pravu

vpliv novejše sodne prakse na presojo rabatov kot zlorab prevladujočega položaja

Matic Špur (Avtor), Martina Repas (Mentor)

Povzetek

Magistrska naloga obravnava vpliv novejše sodne prakse, zlasti zadeve Intel proti Komisiji, na presojo rabatov v konkurenčnem pravu. V starejši sodni praksi so zvestobni rabati in rabati tretje kategorije, obravnavani kot per se zlorabe. To pomeni, da se o njihovem protikonkurenčnem učinku sklepa na podlagi njihove oblike in ne na podlagi ekonomske analize njihovega konkretnega vpliva na konkurenco na upoštevnem trgu. Komisija je z Navodili glede ocene izključevalnih zlorab (v nadaljevanju: Navodila Komisije) odstopila od per se pristopa in delitve rabatov glede na njihovo obliko ter uvedla pristop, ki temelji na ekonomskih merilih, predvsem na testu enako učinkovitega konkurenta. Per se pristop iz starejše sodne prakse je že nakazoval določene podobnosti med obravnavo zvestobnih rabatov in rabatov tretje kategorije z obravnavo omejevalnih sporazumov, ki izkrivljajo konkurenco »po cilju« v smislu člena 101 PDEU. V zadevi Intel proti Komisiji pa je Sodišče EU dokončno dopolnilo per se pristop tako, da je rabate popolnoma približalo zlorabam »po cilju«, kot jih določa člen 101 PDEU. Skladno s tem pa je tudi posredno »odprlo vrata« presoji rabatnih shem, kot jo določa Komisija v Navodilih Komisije. Podjetje bo lahko namreč predočilo dokaze, da ravnanje ni zmožno omejevati konkurence in zlasti imeti očitanih učinkov izrinjenja. Če podjetje predloži takšne dokaze, lahko izpodbije stališče Komisije, da rabati predstavljajo zlorabo »po cilju«. Kadar podjetje uspe izpodbiti stališče Komisije, da zadevna rabatna shema sodi med zlorabe »po cilju«, mora Komisija preučiti dejanske ali potencialne učinke take sheme na izključitev enako učinkovitih konkurentov s trga. V tem primeru se morajo rabati presojati kot zlorabe »po učinku« na podlagi »pravila utemeljenosti«. V okviru tega pravila morajo konkurenčni organi presoditi moč prevladujočega položaja podjetja na upoštevnem trgu, stopnjo pokritosti trga z očitanim ravnanjem, pogoje in okoliščine odobritve zadevnih rabatov, njihovo trajanje in njihov znesek ter presoditi morebiten obstoj strategije, katere namen je izriniti konkurente, ki so vsaj enako učinkoviti. S tem je Sodišče EU v zadevi Intel proti Komisiji potrdilo pristop Komisije k rabatom, izoblikovanim v Navodilih Komisije.

Ključne besede

per se pristop;"bolj ekonomski" pristop;zloraba prevladujočega položaja;Hoffmann-La Roche;Post Danmark II;Intel proti Komisiji;zvestobni rabati;rabati tretje kategorije;progresivni rabati;retroaktivni rabati;magistrska dela;

Podatki

Jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Leto izida:	2018
Tipologija:	2.09 - Magistrsko delo
Organizacija:	UM PF - Pravna fakulteta
Založnik:	[M. Špur]
UDK:	339.137:658.8.033(043.3)
COBISS:	5688107
Št. ogledov:	837
Št. prenosov:	123
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Angleški jezik
Sekundarni naslov:	Rebates in competition law: the impact of recent case-law on the assessement of rebates as an abuse of a dominant position
Sekundarni povzetek:	The master's thesis deals with the impact of recent case-law, in particular Intel v Commission, on the assessment of rebates in competition law. In older case-law, loyal rebates and rebates of a third category are treated as per se abusive. This means that their anti-competitive effect is assessed based on their form and not on the basis of economic analysis of their concrete impact on competition in the relevant market The Commission has adopted the Commission's Guidelines on exclusionary abuses (henceforth: Commission’s Guidelines) in which it derogates from the per se approach and categorization of rebates according to their form. The Commissions’ Guidelines also introduced an approach based on economic criteria, in particular on the test of an equally effective competitor. The per se approach from earlier case-law has already indicated certain similarities between the treatment of loyalty rebates and rebates of the third category with collusive agreements that distort competition “by object” as defined by article 101 TFEU. In the Intel v Commission case the Court of Justice of the EU (henceforth: ECJ) finally supplemented the per se approach by drawing parallels between rebates and “by object” abuses as defined in Article 101 TFEU. Accordingly, it also indirectly "opened the door" to the assessment of rebate schemes, as it is defined by the Commission in the Commission's Guidance, as undertakings are now able to provide evidence that the conduct is not capable of restricting competition and having the alleged foreclosure effect. If an undertaking submits such evidence, it may challenge the Commission's view that rebates constitute a “by object” abuse. Where an undertaking succeeds to refute the presumption that the rebate scheme in question falls within the scope of the “by object” restrictions, the Commission must examine actual or potential effects of such a scheme on the exclusion of equally effective competitors from the market In this case, they need to be considered as abuse "by effect" based on the "rule of reason". Under this rule, competition authorities must assess the extent of the undertaking’s dominant position on the relevant market, the share of the market covered by the challenged practice, the conditions for granting the rebates in question, their duration and their amount as well as the possible existence of a strategy aiming to exclude competitors that are at least as efficient as the dominant undertaking from the market. In this way, in the case of Intel v Commission, the ECJ confirmed the Commission's approach to rebates, as set out in the Commission's Guidance.
Sekundarne ključne besede:	per se approach;“more economic” approach;abuse of dominant position;Hoffman-La Roche;Post Danmark II;Intel v Commission;loyalty rebates;rebates of the third category;incremental rebates;retroactive rebates.;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Magistrsko delo/naloga
Komentar na gradivo:	Univ. v Mariboru, Pravna fak.
Strani:	61 str.
ID:	10960365