Long-term auditor-client relationships

conscious misjudgements or unconscious biases?

Povzetek

The aim of our study is to shed light on auditors’ cognitive drivers of bias inherent in long-term personal relationships with clients. We examine whether a long-term personal relationship invokes a conscious misjudgement because of a mutual long-term financial interest, or an unconscious bias invoked by affective motives and unconscious needs. The paper combines two theories, the first being the incentive based motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) and the second the need based motivation theory (McClelland, 1987). We analyse the problem with a two-player perfect-information sequential game within the framework of game theory, involving an accounting choice task. We find that the positive effect of a personal relationship on biased decision-making is mediated by a long-term financial interest rather than by an affective motive such as friendship. Unconscious needs are also found to influence subjects’ decisions. In other words, the need for achievement and the need for power reinforce auditor independent opinion and help them resist the pressure from clients, whereas the need for affiliation is accentuated in a personal relationship and positively affects auditor bias. The study provides an original empirical investigation of the drivers of behaviour in the auditing setting, while its results indicate that both conscious financial incentives and unconscious needs influence subjects’ decisions simultaneously.

Ključne besede

enterprises;accounting;auditing;game theory;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2020
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UL EF - Ekonomska fakulteta
UDK:	657.6
COBISS:	22705411
ISSN:	1580-0466
Št. ogledov:	427
Št. prenosov:	140
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Sekundarni naslov:	Ali pride v dolgoročnih odnosih med revizorjem in stranko do zavedno napačnih presoj ali nezavednih pristranskosti?
Sekundarne ključne besede:	podjetja;računovodstvo;revizija;notranja kontrola;teorija iger;
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Članek v reviji
Strani:	str. 37-67, 154
Letnik:	ǂVol. ǂ22
Zvezek:	ǂno. ǂ1
Čas izdaje:	2020
DOI:	10.15458/ebr94
ID:	11924526