Položaj sodstva v sistemu delitve oblasti

doktorska disertacija

Luka Vavken (Avtor), Rajko Pirnat (Mentor), Igor Kaučič (Član komisije za zagovor), Albin Igličar (Član komisije za zagovor), Rajko Knez (Član komisije za zagovor)

Povzetek

Načelo delitve oblasti je temeljni pogoj za obstoj demokracije. Delitev oblasti v sodobnih, postmodernih državnih ureditvah brez neodvisnega, odgovornega in z zaupanjem javnosti podprtega sodstva ne more obstajati. Sodstvo namreč zagotavlja izvajanje nadzora nad sistemom zavor in ravnovesij. Raziskovalno polje disertacije je v njenem prvem, splošnem delu usmerjeno predvsem na vprašanja, kaj je tretja veja oblasti, kakšno je (slovensko) sodstvo, kdo so njegovi temeljni gradniki, v kolikšni meri nanj vpliva pravna tradicija, ki ji pripada, in v čem je njegova notranja moč v razmerju do političnih vej oblasti. V drugem delu raziskave, ki se osredotoča na položaj slovenskega sodstva v sistemu zavor in ravnovesij, so v ospredju vprašanja, kje je z vidika sodstva središče slovenskega sistema delitve oblasti, kakšna so konkretna razmerja med sodno in zakonodajno ter sodno in izvršilno vejo oblasti ter kakšno vlogo imata pri tem sodniška samouprava in poseben ustavni organ – Sodni svet RS. Spoznanja prvega dela disertacije je mogoče strniti v ugotovitvah, da je sodstvo v sistemu delitve oblasti hkrati najšibkejša in najnevarnejša oblast; da so za ustrezen položaj sodstva v sistemu delitve oblasti ključne tri predpostavke: njegova neodvisnost, odgovornost in zaupanje javnosti; da je delovanje sodstva v veliki meri pogojeno s pravno tradicijo, ki ji pripada; in da moč sodstva ne more temeljiti na populističnem diskurzu, močnih, prepoznavnih in priljubljenih voditeljih, še manj samovoljnosti njegovih odločitev, temveč na doslednem spoštovanju enotne sodne prakse. Spoznanja drugega dela disertacije je v zvezi s slovenskim sodstvom in njegovim položajem v sistemu delitve oblasti mogoče povzeti v ugotovitvah, da je več desetletij delovanja sodstva v nedemokratičnem komunističnem sistemu na njem pustilo določene poškodbe, kljub temu pa so temelji delovanja sodobnega slovenskega sodstva demokratični. Čeprav imamo v Sloveniji neustrezen sistem izvolitve sodnikov v parlamentu, jedro sistema zavor in ravnovesij v praksi ni med sodno in zakonodajno vejo oblasti, temveč med sodno in izvršilno vejo oblasti. Ta pripravlja praktično celotno zakonodajo, zagotavlja materialne pogoje za delovanje sodstva, ima široka inšpekcijska pooblastila v zvezi z delovanjem sodne uprave in pomembno vlogo pri izbiri predsednika Vrhovnega sodišča RS. In končno, kar je najpomembnejše, v vsakodnevni praksi do najostrejših in najpogostejših napetosti ne prihaja v razmerju med sodstvom in parlamentom, temveč med sodstvom in predstavniki vlade. Sodniška samouprava ima pomembno in načeloma pozitivno vlogo pri krepitvi sodstva kot samostojne in neodvisne veje oblasti. Slovenskega sodstva ni mogoče samodejno enačiti s sodnimi sistemi srednje- in vzhodnoevropskih tranzicijskih držav, v katerih imajo predsedniki sodišč praktično absolutno moč in so resnični gospodarji sodstva. Kljub temu pa tudi predsedniki slovenskih sodišč postopoma pridobivajo vedno nova zakonska pooblastila na račun t. i. participativnega vodenja sodišč, pri katerem so pred tem sodelovali vsi sodniki posameznega sodišča ali sodnega oddelka. Ta trend za krepitev položaja sodstva v sistemu delitve oblasti ni ugoden. Ker so sodstvo sodniki, ima ključni vpliv na to, kakšno je slovensko sodstvo in kako močno je v razmerju do drugih dveh vej oblasti, Sodni svet RS, ki dejansko izbira bodoče sodnike. Empirična raziskava je pokazala spodbudno ugotovitev, da je temeljni kriterij, ki ga Sodni svet RS upošteva pri izbiri vseh kandidatov, ki jih predlaga v izvolitev parlamentu, njihova strokovnost.

Ključne besede

pravna država;demokracija;načelo delitve oblasti;sistem zavor in ravnovesij;sodstvo;pravna tradicija;sodniška samouprava;sodni svet;

Podatki

Jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Leto izida:	2022
Tipologija:	2.08 - Doktorska disertacija
Organizacija:	UL PF - Pravna fakulteta
Založnik:	[L. Vavken]
UDK:	342:347.9(043.3)
COBISS:	113755395
Št. ogledov:	176
Št. prenosov:	112
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Angleški jezik
Sekundarni naslov:	The position of judiciary in the separation of powers
Sekundarni povzetek:	The principle of separation of powers is a fundamental precondition for the existence of democracy. The separation of powers in modern, postmodern state systems cannot exist without an independent, accountable, and publicly trusted judiciary. It is the judiciary that ensures control over the system of checks and balances. In its first, general part of the dissertation, the research field is focused mainly on the questions of what the third branch of government is, what the (Slovenian) judiciary is, who its basic building blocks are, to what extent it is influenced by the legal tradition to which it belongs, and in what its internal strength is in relation to the political branches of government. In the second part of the research which focuses on the position of the Slovenian judiciary in the system of checks and balances, the following questions are at the forefront. Where is the center of the Slovenian system of separation of powers from the judicial point of view? What are the specific relations between the judiciary, legislative, and the executive branch of power? What are the roles of the judicial self-government and a special constitutional body – the Judicial Council of the Republic of Slovenia – in the process? The findings of the first part of the dissertation can be summarized in the ascertainments that the judiciary in the system of separation of powers is both the weakest and the most dangerous power, that three preconditions are crucial for the proper position of the judiciary in the system of separation of powers (its independence, responsibility, and public confidence), that the functioning of the judiciary is largely conditioned by the legal tradition to which it belongs, and that the power of the judiciary cannot be based on populist discourse, strong, recognizable, and popular leaders, and even much less on the arbitrariness of its decisions. Instead, it must be based on consistent adherence to uniform case law. The findings of the second part of the dissertation regarding the Slovenian judiciary and its position in the system of separation of powers can be summarized in the findings that several decades of judicial activity in an undemocratic communist system left certain damage to it. Nevertheless, the foundations of the modern Slovenian judiciary are democratic. Although Slovenia has an inadequate system for electing judges in the parliament, the core of the system of checks and balances in practice is not between the judicial and legislative branches of government but between the judicial and executive branches of government. The latter prepares practically all legislation, provides material conditions for the functioning of the judiciary, and has broad inspection powers related to the functioning of the judicial administration and an important role in the election of the President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia. And finally, most importantly, in everyday practice, the sharpest and most common tensions do not arise in the relationship between the judiciary and parliament but between the judiciary and governmental representatives. Judicial self-government has an important and, in principle, positive role in strengthening the judiciary as an independent and autonomous branch of government. The Slovenian judiciary cannot be automatically equated with the judicial systems of Central and Eastern European transition countries in which court presidents have practically absolute power and are the real masters of the judiciary. Nevertheless, the presidents of Slovenian courts are gradually gaining new legal powers at the expense of the so-called participatory management of courts in which all judges of an individual court or judicial department participated previously. This trend of strengthening the position of the judiciary in the system of separation of powers is not favorable. Because the judiciary is judges, the Judicial Council of the Republic of Slovenia, which actually selects future judges, has a key influence on what the Slovenian judiciary is like and how strong it is in relation to the other two branches of government. Empirical research has shown an encouraging ascertainment that the basic criterion that the Judicial Council of the Republic of Slovenia takes into account when selecting all candidates it proposes for election to the parliament is their professionalism.
Sekundarne ključne besede:	Univerzitetna in visokošolska dela;Sodna oblast;Delitev oblasti;
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Doktorsko delo/naloga
Študijski program:	0
Konec prepovedi (OpenAIRE):	1970-01-01
Komentar na gradivo:	Univ. v Ljubljani, Pravna fak.
Strani:	XII, 368 str.
ID:	15711368