review
Chengyi Xia (Avtor), Juan Wang (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor), Zhen Wang (Avtor)

Povzetek

Reputation and reciprocity are key mechanisms for cooperation in human societies, often going hand in hand to favor prosocial behavior over selfish actions. Here we review recent researches at the interface of physics and evolutionary game theory that explored these two mechanisms. We focus on image scoring as the bearer of reputation, as well as on various types of reciprocity, including direct, indirect, and network reciprocity. We review different definitions of reputation and reciprocity dynamics, and we show how these affect the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We consider first-order, second-order, as well as higherorder models in well-mixed and structured populations, and we review experimental works that support and inform the results of mathematical modeling and simulations. We also provide a synthesis of the reviewed researches along with an outlook in terms of six directions that seem particularly promising to explore in the future.

Ključne besede

tvorjenje vzorcev;metoda Monte Carlo;kompleksno omrežje;evolucijska teorija iger;sodelovanje;fizika družbe;ne zaključna dela;pattern formation;Monte Carlo method;complex network;evolutionary game theory;cooperation;social physics;

Podatki

Jezik: Angleški jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 1.02 - Pregledni znanstveni članek
Organizacija: UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Založnik: Elsevier
UDK: 53
COBISS: 153985539 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
ISSN: 1571-0645
Št. ogledov: 28
Št. prenosov: 0
Ocena: 0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik: Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede: Fizika;Metoda Monte Carlo;
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Članek v reviji
Strani: str. 8-45
Zvezek: ǂVol. ǂ46
Čas izdaje: 2023
DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2023.05.002
ID: 24252602
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