Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games

Zhen Wang (Author), Attila Szolnoki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbed.

Keywords

socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;social dilemma;cooperation;public goods;biased utility;interdependent networks;statistical physics of social systems;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2013
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC:	53
COBISS:	19678984
ISSN:	2045-2322
Views:	763
Downloads:	315
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Scientific work
Pages:	7 str.
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ3
Issue:	ǂart. no. ǂ1183
Chronology:	2013
DOI:	10.1038/srep01183
ID:	10844199