Luo-Luo Jiang (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.

Ključne besede

socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;social dilemma;cooperation;public goods;biased utility;interdependent networks;statistical physics of social systems;

Podatki

Jezik: Angleški jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija: UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK: 53
COBISS: 20022792 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
ISSN: 2045-2322
Št. ogledov: 1163
Št. prenosov: 343
Ocena: 0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik: Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede: socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Znanstveno delo
Strani: 6 str.
Letnik: ǂVol. ǂ3
Zvezek: ǂart. no. ǂ2483
Čas izdaje: 2013
DOI: 10.1038/srep02483
ID: 10844208