Attila Szolnoki (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing information about strategy choice between players residing on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary games, the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we observe the spontaneous emergence of correlated behaviour between the two networks, which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regard to content.

Ključne besede

kooperacija;informacija;socialna dilema;javne dobrine;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;cooperation;information;social dilemma;public goods;interdependent networks;statistical physics of social systems;

Podatki

Jezik: Angleški jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija: UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK: 53
COBISS: 19847688 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
ISSN: 1367-2630
Št. ogledov: 1159
Št. prenosov: 410
Ocena: 0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik: Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede: kooperacija;informacija;socialna dilema;javne dobrine;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Članek v reviji
Strani: str. 053010-1-053010-13
Letnik: ǂVol. ǂ15
Zvezek: ǂiss. ǂ5
Čas izdaje: 2013
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/15/5/053010
ID: 10846203