Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation

Zhen Wang (Author), Attila Szolnoki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality.

Keywords

socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;social dilemma;cooperation;public goods;biased utility;interdependent networks;statistical physics of social systems;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2013
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC:	53
COBISS:	20023048
ISSN:	2045-2322
Views:	785
Downloads:	328
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Scientific work
Pages:	7 str.
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ3
Issue:	ǂart. no. ǂ2470
Chronology:	2013
DOI:	10.1038/srep02470
ID:	10844203