Luo-Luo Jiang (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.

Keywords

socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;social dilemma;cooperation;public goods;biased utility;interdependent networks;statistical physics of social systems;

Data

Language: English
Year of publishing:
Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization: UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC: 53
COBISS: 20022792 Link will open in a new window
ISSN: 2045-2322
Views: 1163
Downloads: 343
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Other data

Secondary language: Slovenian
Secondary keywords: socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS): Scientific work
Pages: 6 str.
Volume: ǂVol. ǂ3
Issue: ǂart. no. ǂ2483
Chronology: 2013
DOI: 10.1038/srep02483
ID: 10844208