Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game

Attila Szolnoki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game.Weshow that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate.Weobserve complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning of public goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations.

Keywords

evolucijska teorija iger;igra javnih dobrin;človeško sodelovanje;evolutionary game theory;public goods game;human cooperation;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2016
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC:	53
COBISS:	22452232
ISSN:	1367-2630
Views:	902
Downloads:	332
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	evolucijska teorija iger;igra javnih dobrin;človeško sodelovanje;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Scientific work
Pages:	str. 083021-1-083021-11
Issue:	ǂVol. ǂ18
Chronology:	Aug. 2016
DOI:	10.1088/1367-2630/18/8/083021
ID:	10845299