Uncertainties facilitate aggressive behavior in a spatial hawk-dove game

Povzetek

We study effects of additive spatiotemporal random variations, introduced to the payoffs of a spatial hawk-dove game, on the evolution of the reconciliatory and the aggressive strategy. We show that uncertainties facilitate aggressive behavior for a broad range of resource values. In particular, aggressors thrive best if stochastic influences are of the order of magnitude of deterministic payoff values. We argue that random payoff variations are potent and plausible promoters of aggressive behavior in human as well as animal societies if only the hawk-dove game payoff ranking applies.

Ključne besede

evolucijska teorija iger;igra sokola in goloba;šum;prostorske igre;ne zaključna dela;evolutionary game theory;hawk-dove game;noise;spatial games;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2007
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK:	519.83:534
COBISS:	12133398
ISSN:	0218-1274
Št. ogledov:	2052
Št. prenosov:	61
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Angleški jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede:	Teorija iger;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Članek v reviji
Strani:	str. 4223-4227
Letnik:	ǂVol. ǂ17
Zvezek:	ǂissue ǂ11
Čas izdaje:	Nov. 2007
ID:	8717213