how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
Dirk Helbing (Avtor), Attila Szolnoki (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor), György Szabó (Avtor)

Povzetek

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.

Ključne besede

evolucijska teorija iger;družbena lastnina;prostorske igre;kazen;sociološki sistemi;morala;evolutionary game theory;public goods;spatial games;punishment;social systems;moral;

Podatki

Jezik: Angleški jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija: UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK: 53:33
COBISS: 14377750 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
ISSN: 1367-2630
Št. ogledov: 1691
Št. prenosov: 385
Ocena: 0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik: Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede: evolucijska teorija iger;družbena lastnina;prostorske igre;kazen;sociološki sistemi;morala;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Članek v reviji
Strani: str. 083005-1-083005-14
Letnik: ǂVol. ǂ12
Zvezek: ǂiss. ǂ8
Čas izdaje: 2010
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/12/8/083005
ID: 10846206