Attila Szolnoki (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of defection temptation values.

Ključne besede

evolucijska teorija iger;dilema zapornika;prostorske igre;koevolucija;sociološki sistemi;evolutionary game theory;prisoner's dilemma;spatial games;coevolution;social systems;

Podatki

Jezik: Angleški jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija: UM PEF - Pedagoška fakulteta
UDK: 519.83:536.94
COBISS: 13685014 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
ISSN: 1367-2630
Št. ogledov: 1107
Št. prenosov: 354
Ocena: 0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik: Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede: evolucijska teorija iger;dilema zapornika;prostorske igre;koevolucija;sociološki sistemi;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Znanstveno delo
Strani: str. 093033-1-093033-11
Letnik: ǂVol. ǂ10
Zvezek: ǂiss. ǂ9
Čas izdaje: 2009
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/11/9/093033
ID: 10845302