Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks

Attila Szolnoki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of defection temptation values.

Keywords

evolucijska teorija iger;dilema zapornika;prostorske igre;koevolucija;sociološki sistemi;evolutionary game theory;prisoner's dilemma;spatial games;coevolution;social systems;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2009
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM PEF - Faculty of Education
UDC:	519.83:536.94
COBISS:	13685014
ISSN:	1367-2630
Views:	1107
Downloads:	354
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	evolucijska teorija iger;dilema zapornika;prostorske igre;koevolucija;sociološki sistemi;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Scientific work
Pages:	str. 093033-1-093033-11
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ10
Issue:	ǂiss. ǂ9
Chronology:	2009
DOI:	10.1088/1367-2630/11/9/093033
ID:	10845302