Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack

Abstract

We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game on scale-free networks that are subjected to intentional and random removal of vertices. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on scale-free networks is extremely robust against random deletionof vertices, but declines quickly if vertices with the maximal degree are targeted. In particular, attack tolerance is lowest if the temptation to defect is largest, whereby a small fraction of removed vertices suffices to decimate cooperators. The decline of cooperation can be directly linked to the decrease of heterogeneity of scale-free networks that sets in due to the removal of high degree vertices. We conclude that the evolution of cooperation is characterized by similar attack and error tolerance as was previously reported for information readiness and spread of viruses on scale-free networks.

Keywords

evolucijska teorija iger;socialna dilema;prostorske igre;kompleksne mreže;evolutionary game theory;social dilemma;spatial games;complex networks;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2009
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC:	519.83:53
COBISS:	13113366
ISSN:	1367-2630
Views:	1078
Downloads:	313
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	evolucijska teorija iger;socialna dilema;prostorske igre;kompleksne mreže;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Scientific work
Pages:	str. 033027-1-033027-8
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ11
Issue:	ǂiss. ǂ3
Chronology:	2009
DOI:	10.1088/1367-2630/11/3/033027
ID:	10845304