Uncertainties facilitate aggressive behavior in a spatial hawk-dove game

Abstract

We study effects of additive spatiotemporal random variations, introduced to the payoffs of a spatial hawk-dove game, on the evolution of the reconciliatory and the aggressive strategy. We show that uncertainties facilitate aggressive behavior for a broad range of resource values. In particular, aggressors thrive best if stochastic influences are of the order of magnitude of deterministic payoff values. We argue that random payoff variations are potent and plausible promoters of aggressive behavior in human as well as animal societies if only the hawk-dove game payoff ranking applies.

Keywords

evolucijska teorija iger;igra sokola in goloba;šum;prostorske igre;ne zaključna dela;evolutionary game theory;hawk-dove game;noise;spatial games;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2007
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC:	519.83:534
COBISS:	12133398
ISSN:	0218-1274
Views:	2052
Downloads:	61
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	English
Secondary keywords:	Teorija iger;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Article
Pages:	str. 4223-4227
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ17
Issue:	ǂissue ǂ11
Chronology:	Nov. 2007
ID:	8717213