Salahuddin M. Kamal (Author), Yas Al-Hadeethi (Author), Fouad A. Abolaban (Author), Fahad M. Al-Marzouki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

We study an evolutionary inspection game where agents can chose between working and shirking. The evolutionary process is staged on a small-world network, through which agents compare their incomes and, based on the outcome, decide which strategy to adopt. Moreover, we introduce union members that have certain privileges, of which the extent depends on the bargaining power of the union. We determine how the union affects the overall performance of the firm that employs the agents, and what are its influences on the employees. We find that, depending on its bargaining power, the union has significant leverage to deteriorate the productivity of a firm, and consequently also to lower the long-run benefits of the employees.

Keywords

kooperacija;javne dobrine;inšpekcija;sindikati;fizika socioloških sistemov;cooperation;public goods;inspection;unions;physics of social systems;

Data

Language: English
Year of publishing:
Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization: UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC: 53
COBISS: 21222152 Link will open in a new window
ISSN: 2045-2322
Views: 772
Downloads: 289
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Other data

Secondary language: Slovenian
Secondary keywords: kooperacija;javne dobrine;inšpekcija;sindikati;fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS): Scientific work
Pages: str. 1-4
Volume: ǂVol. ǂ5
Issue: ǂart. no. ǂ8881
Chronology: 2015
DOI: 10.1038/srep08881
ID: 9142740