Salahuddin M. Kamal (Avtor), Yas Al-Hadeethi (Avtor), Fouad A. Abolaban (Avtor), Fahad M. Al-Marzouki (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

We study an evolutionary inspection game where agents can chose between working and shirking. The evolutionary process is staged on a small-world network, through which agents compare their incomes and, based on the outcome, decide which strategy to adopt. Moreover, we introduce union members that have certain privileges, of which the extent depends on the bargaining power of the union. We determine how the union affects the overall performance of the firm that employs the agents, and what are its influences on the employees. We find that, depending on its bargaining power, the union has significant leverage to deteriorate the productivity of a firm, and consequently also to lower the long-run benefits of the employees.

Ključne besede

kooperacija;javne dobrine;inšpekcija;sindikati;fizika socioloških sistemov;cooperation;public goods;inspection;unions;physics of social systems;

Podatki

Jezik: Angleški jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija: UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK: 53
COBISS: 21222152 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
ISSN: 2045-2322
Št. ogledov: 772
Št. prenosov: 289
Ocena: 0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik: Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede: kooperacija;javne dobrine;inšpekcija;sindikati;fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Znanstveno delo
Strani: str. 1-4
Letnik: ǂVol. ǂ5
Zvezek: ǂart. no. ǂ8881
Čas izdaje: 2015
DOI: 10.1038/srep08881
ID: 9142740