Xiaojie Chen (Author), Tatsuya Sasaki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.

Keywords

kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;vzdržen razvoj;fizika socioloških sistemov;cooperation;public goods;punishment;sustainable development;physics of social systems;

Data

Language: English
Year of publishing:
Typology: 1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization: UM FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
UDC: 53
COBISS: 21772552 Link will open in a new window
ISSN: 2045-2322
Views: 734
Downloads: 339
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Other data

Secondary language: Slovenian
Secondary keywords: kooperacija;javne dobrine;kazen;vzdržen razvoj;fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS): Scientific work
Pages: str. 1-12
Volume: ǂVol. ǂ5
Issue: ǂart. no. ǂ17050
Chronology: 2015
DOI: 10.1038/srep17050
ID: 9142755