Zhen Wang (Avtor), Attila Szolnoki (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality.

Ključne besede

socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;social dilemma;cooperation;public goods;biased utility;interdependent networks;statistical physics of social systems;

Podatki

Jezik: Angleški jezik
Leto izida:
Tipologija: 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija: UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK: 53
COBISS: 20023048 Povezava se bo odprla v novem oknu
ISSN: 2045-2322
Št. ogledov: 785
Št. prenosov: 328
Ocena: 0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki: JSON JSON-RDF JSON-LD TURTLE N-TRIPLES XML RDFA MICRODATA DC-XML DC-RDF RDF

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik: Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede: socialna dilema;kooperacija;javne dobrine;pristranski donosi;soodvisne mreže;statistična fizika socioloških sistemov;
URN: URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS): Znanstveno delo
Strani: 7 str.
Letnik: ǂVol. ǂ3
Zvezek: ǂart. no. ǂ2470
Čas izdaje: 2013
DOI: 10.1038/srep02470
ID: 10844203