Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attack

Povzetek

We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game on scale-free networks that are subjected to intentional and random removal of vertices. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on scale-free networks is extremely robust against random deletionof vertices, but declines quickly if vertices with the maximal degree are targeted. In particular, attack tolerance is lowest if the temptation to defect is largest, whereby a small fraction of removed vertices suffices to decimate cooperators. The decline of cooperation can be directly linked to the decrease of heterogeneity of scale-free networks that sets in due to the removal of high degree vertices. We conclude that the evolution of cooperation is characterized by similar attack and error tolerance as was previously reported for information readiness and spread of viruses on scale-free networks.

Ključne besede

evolucijska teorija iger;socialna dilema;prostorske igre;kompleksne mreže;evolutionary game theory;social dilemma;spatial games;complex networks;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2009
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UM FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
UDK:	519.83:53
COBISS:	13113366
ISSN:	1367-2630
Št. ogledov:	1078
Št. prenosov:	313
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede:	evolucijska teorija iger;socialna dilema;prostorske igre;kompleksne mreže;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Znanstveno delo
Strani:	str. 033027-1-033027-8
Letnik:	ǂVol. ǂ11
Zvezek:	ǂiss. ǂ3
Čas izdaje:	2009
DOI:	10.1088/1367-2630/11/3/033027
ID:	10845304