Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation

Attila Szolnoki (Author), Matjaž Perc (Author)

Abstract

Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.

Keywords

evolucijska teorija iger;dilema zapornika;prostorske igre;igra sokola in orla;koevolucija;evolutionary game theory;prisoner's dilemma;spatial games;snowdrift game;coevolution;

Data

Language:	English
Year of publishing:	2008
Typology:	1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:	UM PEF - Faculty of Education
UDC:	519.83:53
COBISS:	12216342
ISSN:	1367-2630
Views:	784
Downloads:	410
Average score:	0 (0 votes)
Metadata:

Other data

Secondary language:	Slovenian
Secondary keywords:	evolucijska teorija iger;dilema zapornika;prostorske igre;igra sokola in orla;koevolucija;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Type (COBISS):	Scientific work
Pages:	str. 043036-1-043036-9
Volume:	ǂVol. ǂ10
Issue:	ǂiss. ǂ4
Chronology:	2008
DOI:	10.1088/1367-2630/10/4/043036
ID:	10845298