Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation

Attila Szolnoki (Avtor), Matjaž Perc (Avtor)

Povzetek

Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.

Ključne besede

evolucijska teorija iger;dilema zapornika;prostorske igre;igra sokola in orla;koevolucija;evolutionary game theory;prisoner's dilemma;spatial games;snowdrift game;coevolution;

Podatki

Jezik:	Angleški jezik
Leto izida:	2008
Tipologija:	1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:	UM PEF - Pedagoška fakulteta
UDK:	519.83:53
COBISS:	12216342
ISSN:	1367-2630
Št. ogledov:	784
Št. prenosov:	410
Ocena:	0 (0 glasov)
Metapodatki:

Ostali podatki

Sekundarni jezik:	Slovenski jezik
Sekundarne ključne besede:	evolucijska teorija iger;dilema zapornika;prostorske igre;igra sokola in orla;koevolucija;
URN:	URN:SI:UM:
Vrsta dela (COBISS):	Znanstveno delo
Strani:	str. 043036-1-043036-9
Letnik:	ǂVol. ǂ10
Zvezek:	ǂiss. ǂ4
Čas izdaje:	2008
DOI:	10.1088/1367-2630/10/4/043036
ID:	10845298